Overview
More than simply theory, policy frameworks provide individuals with a blueprint for
understanding how public policy is generated in a democratic society. Despite policy theories
existing primarily in an ethereal sphere, the practical application and observation of policy
formation can be seen in everyday contexts, provided one is willing to open their mind to
identifying the factors that contribute to public policy formation.
This assignment aims to provide you with an opportunity to read, synthesize, and relate
established public policy theory frameworks within the context of practical application. For this
assignment, you will need to read and select one of the policy theory frameworks outlined in the
Weible and Sabatier (2017) text Theories of the Policy Process (4th Ed.). Although the book
contains multiple policy theory frameworks, this assignment will require you to read and select a
policy theory framework which both interests you and finds practical application through
observing modern public policy issues.
The first part of the assignment will require you to provide a synopsis of the policy theory
framework selected, including pertinent information regarding the evolution of the policy theory
framework itself (previous research, notable contributions, examples of how it has been utilized
etc.), the strengths of the policy theory framework selected (such as ease of application, viability,
or ease of comprehension/observation), and your own personal interpretation or
conceptualization of how the policy theory framework unfolds. This part of the paper will
require some creativity, as each student may conceptualize the framework differently or within
different contexts. For example, I have noted before that I have conceptualized the Punctuated
Equilibrium theory of policy formation as similar to the video game Pac-Man to illustrate
periods of smaller policy change interspersed with large ‘punctuations’. Feel free to use
descriptions, illustrations, or any other method you believe will help you relay how you
conceptualize the policy theory framework you have selected!
Following the policy theory framework synopsis, you will need to introduce and explain how the
policy theory framework you have selected can be seen through modern or current public policy
issues. This can be accomplished by outlining and addressing how components of the policy
theory framework you have selected play out within the context of public policy. Additionally,
you are welcome (as well as encouraged) to incorporate additional resources outside of the
assigned readings if you believe they align with the core concepts contained within the policy
theory framework selected.
The Policy Theory Framework Analysis assignment should be between 6-8 full pages, using
proper APA format for in-text citations and references as outlined.
The Advocacy Coalition Framework: An Overview of the
Research Program
HANK C. JENKINS-SMITH, DANIEL NOHRSTEDT, CHRISTOPHER M. WEIBLE, AND KARIN INGOLD
The study of policy processes brings focus to many questions of both theoretical and
practical significance. Some questions concern policy change and stasis over time: What
factors explain the likelihood of occurrence of major and minor policy change? To what
extent is policy change affecting government agencies and procedures and, through them,
broader public opinion? Another set of questions involves learning by actors: To what extent
are actors learning from their experiences, from the experiences of others, or from scientific
and technical information? What factors facilitate learning among allies and among
opponents? Yet another set of questions centers on the behavior of actors who directly or
indirectly attempt to influence policy processes by advocating for change or maintenance of
the status quo: Under what conditions do actors form and maintain coalitions to achieve
their policy objectives in a coordinated fashion? What are the characteristics of the network
structures of these coalitions? To what extent, and in what ways, do opposing coalition actors
interact?
To answer these questions is to provide insight into some of the fundamental themes of
governance and politics that ultimately affect the composition, dynamics, and course of
society. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of one framework that can
help answer these questions: the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF).1 The chapter begins
with a summary of the intellectual foundations of the ACF. It then provides an overview of
the framework and its theoretical foci, including assessments of the hypotheses based on
extensive empirical applications. The chapter ends by suggesting an ongoing agenda to
continue the advancement of the ACF research program.
INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE ACF
The ACF was created in the early 1980s by Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith. Chief
inspirations were drawn from past shortcomings in policy process research, including a need
to develop an alternative policy process theory to overcome the limitations of the stages
heuristic; a need to provide theoretical insight into the role of scientific and technical
information in policy debates; a need to shed light on ideological disagreement and policy
conflicts; and a need to provide a comprehensive approach to understanding politics and
policy change over time that went beyond traditional emphases in political science on
government institutions (e.g., executive, legislative, and judiciary) and a few forms of
political behavior (e.g., voting and lobbying) (see the discussion in Sabatier 1991).
Establishing the framework took several years of effort that included conference papers
written by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, ongoing data collection through interviews and
surveys, and the creation of code forms for measuring belief systems and coalition stability
over time.2
The foundations of the ACF were also influenced by debates in the philosophy of sciences
that were still prominent in the 1970s and 1980s. Partly in response to Thomas Kuhn’s
(1962) notion of scientific revolutions and paradigm shifts, Imré Lakatos developed his
conception of the evolution of scientific research “programmes” in an effort to rescue the
conception of cumulative, falsifiable science and the growth of knowledge (Lakatos 1970). A
key contribution from Lakatos was the notion that scientific theories can be described as
consisting of a “hard core” of unchanging and largely axiomatic propositions surrounded by
a “protective belt” of auxiliary hypotheses that can be adjusted (or rejected) in response to
potentially falsifiable evidence. This concept is a recognizable ancestor of the structure of
belief systems in the ACF, which are characterized as hierarchically structured with a deep
core of ontological and normative beliefs that are extraordinarily difficult to change, and
“secondary aspects” of more specific propositions about how to effectively translate core
beliefs into policy.3
A second important contribution was drawn from Lakatos’s related proposition that—
given that Popper’s ([1935] 2002) ideal of falsifiable theories had proven implausible—
theoretical progress was most readily evident in “progressive problem-shift.” As noted by
Kuhn (1962), counterevidence need not displace a theory; empirical anomalies can persist
for hundreds of years while a theory hangs on because (1) ad hoc defense of a theory was
too effective to displace a vital theory and (2) a ready replacement theory was not available.
Lakatos argued that ad hoc defense of a theory fails if it is persistently regressive—meaning
ad hoc “adjustments” of theories to accommodate counterevidence do not add new
theoretical content that can be (and eventually is) empirically verified. Lakatos also argued
that healthy theories experience progressive problem- shift, wherein theoretical
adjustments (i.e., new concepts and hypotheses added to the theory) not only address
counterevidence but also add new empirical content that extends the explanatory reach of
the theory. Hence, defense (or expansion) of a theory needs to be progressive to be
scientifically legitimate. For Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, this conception of scientific
progress characterized the spirit of the theoretical growth of the ACF. The basic framework
of the ACF (e.g., the assumptions and general subsystem dynamics) characterized the hard
core while new propositions and theoretical logic (e.g., the addition of the concepts of
coalition opportunity structures and endogenous pathways to policy change) occupy the
auxiliary belt. Thus, revisions to the auxiliary belt were acceptable as long as they added new
substantive theoretical content to the ACF. Indeed, the many additions to, and revisions of,
key ACF hypotheses are reflections of this view of theory change and the growth of
knowledge. Naturally, the assessment of whether these cumulative changes are
truly progressive remains an open and important question.
The earliest journal publications of the ACF began with Sabatier (1986), where the ACF
was described as a synthesis of top-down and bottom-up approaches to implementation, and
continued with Sabatier and Pelkey (1987), where the ACF was described as an approach to
understand regulatory policymaking.4 The first overview of the ACF by Sabatier (1987) was
published in Knowledge, and a nearly identical publication by Sabatier (1988) led to the
symposium on the ACF in Policy Sciences.5 Jenkins-Smith’s work on policy analysis within a
process characterized by advocacy coalitions was published soon after (Jenkins-Smith,
1990). Applications of the framework slowly accumulated, with a coedited volume by
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith published in 1993.
The ACF has since become one of the most utilized frameworks of the policy process. The
ACF has been the topic of five special issues in peer-reviewed journals, including Policy
Sciences (Sabatier 1988), PS: Political Science & Politics (Sabatier 1991), Policy Studies
Journal (Weible et al. 2011), Administration & Society (Scott 2012), and Journal of
Comparative Policy Analysis (Henry et al. 2014). Weible, Sabatier, and McQueen (2009) and
Pierce et al. (2017) conducted comprehensive reviews of over 240 English-language ACF
applications from 1987 through 2014 that span the globe.6 Additionally, Sotirov and
Memmler (2012) reviewed ACF applications in the context of environmental and natural
resource issues. Country-specific reviews have been conducted for applications of the ACF
in South Korea (Jang et al. 2016) and Sweden (Nohrstedt and Olofsson, 2016b). Jang et al.
(2016) found 62 ACF applications in Korean, suggesting the ACF is frequently applied in
other languages. One edited volume compares and contrasts advocacy coalitions and policy
change on the topic of unconventional oil and gas development across seven countries in
North America and Western Europe (Weible et al. 2016). In aggregate, these reviews confirm
the portability of the ACF to different policy issues and governing systems, but they also
expose areas where the ACF’s concepts and assumptions appear to be less applicable and
problematic. We return to these issues below when discussing a research agenda for the
future.
The ACF offers a general foundation for single case studies and for comparative analyses
of policy processes across a wide range of policy issues and governing systems. Although a
single chapter cannot adequately summarize the development of the ACF over time, present
all the intricacies of the framework, list all the hypotheses offered by various analysts, or
synthesize the findings from various applications of the framework, we offer here a synthesis
of the most recent developments in the ACF and encourage interested readers to explore
past theoretical and empirical publications as cited herein.
THE FRAMEWORK AND THEORETICAL EMPHASES
Borrowing from Easton (1965), Laudan (1977, 70–120), Lakatos (1970), and Ostrom (2005,
27–29), the ACF is best thought of as a framework supporting multiple, overlapping
theoretical foci.7 The purpose of a framework is to provide a shared research platform that
enables analysts to work together in describing, explaining, and, sometimes, predicting
phenomena within and across different contexts. The components of a framework include a
statement of the assumptions, description of the scope or type of questions the framework
is intended to help answer, and the establishment of concept categories and their general
relations. Most importantly, a framework provides a common vocabulary to help analysts
communicate across disciplines, from different substantive policy areas, and from different
parts of the world. Akin to Lakatos’s hard core foundation of a research program, a
framework should be fairly stable in its basic premises over time. Additionally, frameworks
are not directly testable but provide guidance toward specific areas of descriptive and
explanatory inquiry. This is an important reminder, given the misperception among some
students and researchers that a comprehensive “test” of the ACF requires empirical
assessments of all its components and relationships among them.
Rather, a framework supports multiple theories, which are narrower in scope and
emphasize a smaller set of questions, variables, and relationships. Theories provide more
precise conceptual and operational definitions of concepts and interrelate concepts in the
form of testable and falsifiable hypotheses or propositions. The theories within the
framework are where students and researchers should attempt to test and develop
descriptions and explanations. Theories are, hence, akin to Lakatos’s protective belt that can
(and should) be subject to experimentation, adjustment, and modifications over time.
Although hypotheses should ideally offer refutable expectations among concepts, a
pragmatic reason for using hypotheses is to highlight the most important relationships that
describe what, why, and how those concepts relate and when and where those relationships
are expected to be evident (Whetten 1987).
A SUMMARY OF THE ACF AS A “FRAMEWORK”
A framework is best described by its assumptions, scope (type of questions), and basic
categories of concepts and general relations for answering research questions. This section
provides an overview of the framework of the ACF.
Assumptions
The policy subsystem is the primary unit of analysis for understanding policy processes.
Policy subsystems are defined by a policy topic, territorial scope, and the actors directly or
indirectly influencing policy subsystem affairs. Policy subsystems have several defining
properties that help in interpretation and application (Sabatier 1998; Nohrstedt and Weible
2010). First, subsystems contain a large set of components that interact in nontrivial ways
to produce outputs and outcomes for a given policy topic. These components range from
physical and institutional characteristics to actor attributes, including belief systems and
political resources. One of the purposes of a framework and its theories is to specify some of
the most important subsystem components to study in attempting to help solve puzzles
concerning the policy process. Second, policy subsystems demarcate the integrated and
nonintegrated actors on a given policy topic. Policy subsystems do not involve all people
interested and affected by the policy decisions. Indeed, given limited time and attention,
most people do not engage in any subsystem and, for those who do, the number of policy
subsystems where they are active is finite and usually small in number. Third, policy
subsystems are semi-independent but overlap with other subsystems and are nested within
yet other subsystems. For example, an energy policy subsystem in Colorado overlaps with a
food policy subsystem in the same state and nests within a national energy policy subsystem
in the United States.8 Fourth, policy subsystems often provide some authority or potential
for authority. Such authority may exist in the enforcement and monitoring of policy, the
legislative or legal processes, or the potential for new policies that may alter the status quo.
Fifth, policy subsystems undergo periods of stasis, incremental change, and major change.
The set of relevant subsystem actors include any person regularly attempting to influence
subsystem affairs. Borrowing from Heclo (1978), the depiction of subsystem actors expands
beyond traditional interpretations of the policy process that tends to focus narrowly on
legislative committees, government agencies, and interest groups. Subsystems are affected
by any actor directly or indirectly influencing subsystem affairs and may include officials
from any level of government, representatives from the private sector, members from
nonprofit organizations, members of the news media, academic scientists and researchers,
private consultants, lobbyists, think tanks, and even members of the courts (Hjern and
Porter 1981). The extent and consistency of involvement and influence of these actors, of
course, varies.
Individuals are boundedly rational, with limited ability to process stimuli, motivated by
belief systems, and prone to experience the “devil shift.” The ACF conception of individuals
is based on a modified version of methodological individualism, that is, change in the world
is primarily driven by people and not by organizations (Sabatier 1987, 685). In the
terms coalition beliefs, coalition behavior, and coalition learning, coalition is used
metaphorically in reference to the individuals comprising the coalition. Indeed, coalitions do
not learn, but rather the actors within coalitions learn. Furthermore, the modified version of
methodological individualism in the ACF does not suggest that people’s behavior is
independent of context. Indeed, the theory within the ACF would expect that people’s
behavior is shaped by various contextual factors, particularly, the nature of relevant
institutions, the intensity of conflict, and the perceived severity of threats posed by
opponents.
The ACF’s assumption that individuals are boundedly rational means that people are
motivated instrumentally by goals but are often unclear how to achieve those goals, and they
are limited in their cognitive abilities to process stimuli such as information and experience
(Simon 1957, 1985). Additionally, given limited cognitive abilities, individuals simplify the
world through their belief systems and are, therefore, prone to biased assimilation of stimuli
(Munro and Ditto 1997; Munro et al. 2002).
The ACF assumes that policy actors have a three-tiered belief system structure. Deep core
beliefs are fundamental normative values and ontological axioms. Deep core beliefs are not
policy specific and, thus, can be applicable to multiple policy subsystems. One way to
conceptualize and measure deep core beliefs is by incorporating insights from cultural
theory (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Ripberger et al. 2014; Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014;
Trousset et al. 2015). Cultural theory offers four distinct orientations—hierarchs,
egalitarians, individualists, and fatalists. Each of these orientations is buttressed by a set of
“myths”—about human nature, society, and natural systems—that can serve both to justify
the orientation and its values and to imply appropriate forms of social organization (Douglas
and Wildavsky 1982; Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990). Whereas cultural theory has
demonstrated its utility as one way of conceptualizing and measuring deep core beliefs
especially for comparative analyses, other ways certainly exist and could be developed.
In contrast to deep core beliefs, policy core beliefs are bound by scope and topic to the
policy subsystem and thus have territorial and topical components. Policy core beliefs can
be normative and empirical. Normatively, policy core beliefs may reflect basic orientation
and value priorities for the policy subsystem and may identify whose welfare in the policy
subsystem is of greatest concern. Empirically, policy core beliefs include overall assessments
of the seriousness of the problem, basic causes of the problem, and preferred solutions for
addressing the problem (called policy core policy preferences). Secondary beliefs deal with a
subset of the policy subsystem or the specific instrumental means for achieving the desired
outcomes outlined in the policy core beliefs.9 Finally, the ACF borrows one of the key findings
from prospect theory that people remember losses more readily than gains (Quattrone and
Tversky 1988). Remembering losses and the tendency to filter and assimilate stimuli
through belief systems result in the “devil shift,” where actors exaggerate the power and
maliciousness of their opponents (Sabatier, Hunter, and McLaughlin 1987). The expected
result is a noncollaborative attitude, growing mistrust, the protraction of conflict, and the
obstruction of effective policy solutions (Fischer et al. 2016).
Subsystems are simplified by aggregating actors into one or more coalitions. Depicting
policy subsystems as consisting of any actor attempting to directly or indirectly influence
subsystems affairs presents a dilemma for analysts: there might be hundreds of actors
somehow involved in a policy subsystem. Also, analysts encounter subsystems at different
levels of maturity; mature subsystems comprise relatively established and clearly
differentiated coalitions, whereas nascent or emergent subsystems are characterized by
ambivalence and unclear political positions. Simplifying assumptions must be made to
describe and analyze.10 Analysts could organize subsystems by organizational affiliation,
which provides important insight into the resources and strategies of actors in the policy
subsystem, but the organizational level of analysis comes at the cost of realizing that the
number of organizations involved in the policy subsystem is not many fewer than the
number of actors.
A more effective approach is to organize actors into one or more advocacy coalitions on
the basis of shared beliefs and coordination strategies. By grouping and analyzing actors by
coalitions, the analysts can simplify the hundreds of actors and their organizational
affiliations into groupings that may be stable over time (Sabatier and Brasher 1993) and that
are instrumental for understanding policy actors’ strategies for influence and policy change
(Nohrstedt 2010). Aggregating actors into coalitions can follow the rule of first identifying
actors sharing similar belief systems, and subsequently searching for a nontrivial degree of
coordination among those actors (Henry 2011). It then also raises original questions such as
the degree of cross-coalition interactions, intracoalition cohesiveness, and factors
contributing to coalition defection (Jenkins- Smith, St. Clair, and Woods 1991).
Policies and programs incorporate implicit theories reflecting the translated beliefs of one
or more coalitions. Public policy can be conceptualized and defined in multiple ways
(Birkland 2010, 8). Whereas some definitions can be simply stated and communicated, such
as defining public policy as any inaction and action by government, other definitions are
more nuanced and insightful. Lasswell and Kaplan (1950, 71), for example, describe policy
as “a projected program of goal values and practices.” Notable from this definition, and
from similar ones, is the insight that public policy consists of translations of the belief
systems of the designers. In this regard, public policies represent the political maneuvering
and negotiations not just among coalitions but also of causal theories (Pressman and
Wildavsky 1973, xv; Mazmanian and Sabatier 1983, 5). Causal theory, when used to describe
the implicit or explicit content of public policy, refers to the sequence of steps, a linking of
anticipated events, or desired procedures that describe the reasoning for achieving outputs
and outcomes of a public policy. Analysts applying the ACF should, therefore, interpret
policies not just as the actions or inactions of government but also as the translations of belief
systems as manifested in goals, rules, incentives, sanctions, subsidies, taxes, and other
instruments regulating any given issue (Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014, 486). This interpretation
of policy provides insight into why coalition actors advocate so intently over time and how
they interpret public policies as bolstering or as being antithetical to their belief systems.
Scientific and technical information is important for understanding subsystem affairs. In
the previous assumption, belief systems were described as the mechanism for simplifying
and interpreting the world. Belief systems are not, however, simply abstract representations
of values and priorities but also encapsulate policy actors’ perceived causal patterns and
relationships that shape the empirical world. A major source of this causal representation in
a given context is scientific and technical information that can point to specific causal
relations, problem attributes, and, sometimes, policy alternatives. To better understand
policy processes is thus to understand how scientific and technical explanations are
integrated into (or deflected from) belief systems, used in political debates and negotiations,
and integrated with other forms of knowledge, especially local knowledge.11
Researchers should adopt a long-term time perspective (e.g., ten years or more) to
understand policy processes and change. Policy processes are ongoing without beginning or
end (Lindblom 1968, 4) and, thus, strategic behavior and learning of coalition actors, the
reasoning and patterns of policy change, and assessments of the success or failure of public
policy should be understood from a long-term perspective. The point has been
misinterpreted to mean that a perspective of ten years or more is required to interpret policy
processes through the ACF. This is too literal of an interpretation and often prevents
interested analysts from applying the ACF even if the framework could help answer their
research question. Some questions, for example, require intensive methods of data collection
that preclude longitudinal data, such as an understanding of coalition structure using
quantitative network analysis approaches (Henry 2011). Other datasets permit long-term
perspectives, such as the multidecade perspectives taken by Albright (2011), Andersson
(1999), and others to understand patterns of policy change. We also know that coalitions,
though existing for decades, often take short-term perspectives as opportunities and
constraints alter their immediate strategies (Jenkins-Smith, St. Clair, and Woods 1991). The
general meaning behind this assumption is the recognition that understanding public policy
requires focusing on temporal processes that characterize public policy over time.
Scope
A framework’s scope provides the set of general questions about the policy process that it
helps the analyst answer. The traditional scope of the ACF includes questions involving
coalitions, learning, and policy change. As suggested by the assumptions above, the
framework is most useful for understanding these topics in high-conflict situations at the
subsystem level of analysis. However, the framework has been applied in other settings, such
as at the organizational level in collaborative settings (Leach and Sabatier 2005; Leach et al.
2013), a form of application to which we return when discussing future research agendas.
General Conceptual Categories and Relations
Flow diagrams are useful for identifying general categories of concepts and how they
relate. Figure 4.1 presents a flow diagram depicting the policy process within the ACF.12 The
policy subsystem is represented by the rectangle on the right illustrating a case with two
competing coalitions representing their actors’ beliefs and resources. The two coalitions use
various strategies to influence decisions by government authorities that affect institutional
rules, policy outputs, and, eventually, policy outcomes. These decisions then feed back into
the policy subsystem but also can affect external subsystem affairs.
One category of variables that condition subsystem affairs includes relatively stable
parameters, which are the basic social, cultural, economic, physical, and institutional
structures that embed a policy subsystem (Hofferbert 1974; Heclo 1974). Some concepts
within relatively stable parameters are best conceptualized as external to subsystem affairs,
such as the basic constitutional structure of the political system, whereas others can be
internal to the subsystem, such as physical conditions of the subsystem. A second category
of variables consists of dynamic external events, which includes relevant features external
to the subsystem and prone to change. Examples include socioeconomic conditions, the state
of subsystem-relevant technology, public opinion, the composition of governing coalitions
(Burnham 1970), and spillover effects from other policy subsystems. The listings under
relatively stable parameters and dynamic external events in Figure 4.1 are illustrative
examples and are not exhaustive; clearly, other concepts can be placed in each category, such
as crises and disasters under dynamic external events (Nohrstedt 2011; Jenkins-Smith, St.
Clair, and Woods 1991). In between relatively stable parameters and a policy subsystem is
an intermediary category of concepts concerning the nature of the long-term coalition
opportunity structures that establish the degree of consensus needed for major policy
change, the openness of the political system, and overlapping societal cleavages.
Essentially, long-term coalition opportunity structures are some of the important byproducts of the relatively stable parameters on policy subsystems. Between external events
and policy subsystems are the short-term constraints and resources of subsystem actors;
this means that changes outside the subsystem provide short-term opportunities for
coalitions to exploit.
THEORETICAL EMPHASES
Theoretical Focus on Policy Change
One of the central objectives of the ACF is to contribute to the understanding of policy change
and stability, and this has been the subject of considerable empirical investigation. Thanks
to these contributions, we now have more detailed knowledge about the nature and causes
of policy change within and across policy subsystems than we had just a few decades ago.
What has provoked this focus is the recurrent observation that, although many public
policies and programs remain stable over long periods of time, others are subject to periods
of dramatic and nonincremental change (Sabatier 1988; Baumgartner and Jones
1993).13 For example, indicators of such policy change may include revisions in policy core
components of governmental programs, termination of programs, or launching of new
programs.
Similarly to other theoretical perspectives on policy change (Baybrook and Lindblom
1963; Hall 1993; Rose 1993), the ACF focuses on the directionality of policy evolution and
makes a clear distinction between minor and major policy change (Capano 2009, 2012;
Howlett and Cashore 2009; Nisbet 1972). The level of change in a governmental program is
defined according to the extent to which alterations deviate from previous policy. The ACF
assumes that public policies and programs are translations of policy-oriented beliefs and can
be conceptualized and measured hierarchically, like belief systems. Change in the core
aspects, defined as “major policy change,” indicates significant shifts in the direction or goals
of the subsystem, whereas change in secondary aspects (e.g., change in means for achieving
the goals) is evidence for “minor policy change” (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999, 147–148).
Advocacy coalitions often disagree on proposals related to these components, and policy
debates therefore often revolve around diverging preferences regarding initiatives to either
change or preserve governmental programs (Sabatier and Weible 2007, 195).
Since the belief system categories differ according to their susceptibility to change, minor
policy change should be not as difficult to achieve as major policy change (Sabatier 1988).
For example, minor changes in administrative rules, budgetary allocations, statutory
interpretation, and revision are relatively frequent and do not necessitate as much evidence,
agreement among subsystem actors, or redistribution of resources. By contrast, because
normative (policy core) beliefs are rigidly held and screen out dissonant information, major
policy change is unlikely as long as the advocacy coalition that instituted the program
remains in power.
The ACF offers four conceptual pathways to policy change. The first is attributed to some
external source (e.g., as might be found in the categories of dynamic external events or even
relatively stable parameters from Figure 4.1). External shocks, or perturbations, include
events outside the control of subsystem participants (in terms of their ability to influence
underlying causes and triggers) and involve change in socioeconomic conditions, regime
change, outputs from other subsystems, and extreme events such as some crises and
disasters. These events increase the likelihood of major policy change but require one or
several enabling factors (causal mechanisms), including heightened public and political
attention, agenda change, and most importantly redistribution of coalition resources and
opening and closing of policy venues (Sabatier and Weible 2007, 198–199). A key factor in
this regard is mobilization by minority coalitions to exploit the event, for instance, by
pursuing public narratives to attract attention to favored courses of action and by appealing
to new actors (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999, 148; see also McBeth et al. 2007; Nohrstedt
2008). Because of the importance of these intervening steps, it has been hypothesized that
significant perturbations external to the subsystem are one of the necessary, but not
sufficient, paths for changing the policy core attributes of a governmental program (Sabatier
1988).
Major policy change may also result from a second pathway based on internal events that
(1) occur inside the territorial boundaries and/or the topical area of the policy subsystem
and (2) are more likely affected by subsystem actors (Sabatier and Weible 2007, 204–205).
Various types of internal events, including crises, policy fiascoes, scandals, and failures, are
likely to influence beliefs and heighten attention to certain governmental programs
(Birkland 2006; Bovens and ’t Hart 1996). Advocacy coalitions can be expected to engage in
framing contests over such events and debate the severity of problems, their underlying
causes, attribution of responsibility, and policy implications (Boin, ’t Hart, and McConnell
2009; Nohrstedt and Weible 2010). Internal events can be expected to confirm the policy
core beliefs of minority coalitions and increase doubts about the core beliefs of the dominant
coalition and bring into question the effectiveness of their policies. Whether or not internal
shocks result in major policy change depends on the same mechanisms that mediate the
effect from external shocks.
A third source of minor policy change is policy-oriented learning, but this is likely to
happen incrementally over longer periods of time. Following Caplan, Morrison, and
Stanbaugh (1975) and Weiss (1977), Sabatier (1988) expects that policy analysis seldom
influences specific governmental decisions but often serves an “enlightenment function” by
gradually altering the concepts and assumptions of subsystem participants. In addition,
learning can also facilitate major policy change, but this is more likely when learning takes
place in conjunction with an external or internal shock (Nohrstedt 2005).
A fourth pathway to policy change is through negotiated agreement among previously
warring coalitions and may result in substantial change in governmental programs.
Negotiated agreements may emerge in a variety of ways but are facilitated by collaborative
institutions conducive to negotiation. Specifically, Sabatier and Weible (2007, 205–206)
identify nine prescriptions fostering negotiation: a “hurting stalemate,” broad
representation, leadership, consensus decision rules, funding, commitment by actors,
importance of empirical issues, trust, and lack of alternative venues. The most important
condition instigating negotiations is a “hurting stalemate,” which occurs when warring
coalitions perceive the status quo as unacceptable and do not have access to alternative
venues for achieving their objectives (Weible and Nohrstedt 2012, 132).
A recent review of ACF case studies shows that among 161 empirical applications from
2007 to 2014, learning is the most frequently cited source of policy change (identified in 29
percent of the applications reviewed), followed by external sources and events (28 percent),
negotiated agreements (14 percent), and internal events (6 percent) (Pierce et al. 2017).
In summary, the original version of the ACF offered two hypotheses of policy change,
focusing on external perturbations and power shifts. However, Weible and Nohrstedt (2012,
133) merge the four pathways to policy change into a single hypothesis:
Policy Change Hypothesis 1. Significant perturbations external to the subsystem, a
significant perturbation internal to the subsystem, policy-oriented learning, negotiated
agreement, or some combination thereof is a necessary, but not sufficient, source of change
in the policy core attributes of a governmental program.
There has been strong support for the first policy change hypothesis. Many find support
for at least one of the pathways (Barke 1993; Bischoff 2001; Green and Houlihan 2004;
Tewari 2001; Kübler 2001; Dudley and Richardson 1999). One challenge in testing this
hypothesis is the occurrence of one of the pathways without a change in policy (Weible,
Sabatier, and McQueen 2009; Sotirov and Memmler 2012). Another challenge is explaining
minor policy changes after an external shock (Burnett and Davis 2002; Davis and Davis
1988). Critical in testing the first hypothesis about policy change is to understand how a
coalition can capitalize on (or exploit) the opportunity, which ultimately involves attempts
to either preserve the status quo or seek policy change. This has led some analysts to focus
heavily on coalition resources and strategies following various external events and
developments (Smith 2000; Ameringer 2002; Albright 2011; Ingold 2011; Nohrstedt 2005,
2008).
The second hypothesis relates coalition influence in the subsystem, major policy change,
and nested policy subsystems:
Policy Change Hypothesis 2. The policy core attributes of a government program in a
specific jurisdiction will not be significantly revised as long as the subsystem advocacy
coalition that instated the program remains in power within that jurisdiction—except when
the change is imposed by a hierarchically superior jurisdiction.
There is strong to partial support for Policy Change Hypothesis 2 (Sotirov and Memmler
2012). Studies that confirm the logic of the second policy change hypothesis include Ellison
(1998), Olson, Olson, and Gawronski (1999), Elliot and Schlaepfer (2001), and Kübler
(2001). However, this second policy change hypothesis has been tested but a few times.
One of the next steps in studying policy change will be to focus on developing best
practices for documenting and explaining policy while accounting for context. Too many
studies of policy change apply different methods of data collection and analysis, with the
result that comparison across cases is difficult. In addition, studies adopt slightly different
definitions of policy, which complicates the task of comparing drivers of policy change across
governing systems.
Advocacy Coalitions
Advocacy coalitions are defined by actors who share policy core beliefs and who coordinate
their actions in a nontrivial manner to influence a policy subsystem. In studying coalitions,
analysts typically focus on a range of topics, from the structure and stability of coalition actor
belief systems to the formation and maintenance of coalitions over time. The traditional
hypotheses about advocacy coalition include the following:
Coalition Hypothesis 1. On major controversies within a policy subsystem when policy core
beliefs are in dispute, the lineup of allies and opponents tends to be rather stable over
periods of a decade or so.
Coalition Hypothesis 2. Actors within an advocacy coalition will show substantial
consensus on issues pertaining to the policy core, although less so on secondary
aspects.
Coalition Hypothesis 3. Actors (or coalitions) will give up secondary aspects of their belief
systems before acknowledging weaknesses in the policy core.
Coalition Hypothesis 4. Within a coalition, administrative agencies will usually advocate
more moderate positions than their interest group allies.
Coalition Hypothesis 5. Actors within purposive groups are more constrained in their
expression of beliefs and policy positions than actors from material groups.
From these hypotheses, evidence to date largely confirms Coalition Hypothesis 1 about
the stability of coalitions over time (see Pierce et al. 2017 review paper). To assess the
stability of coalitions, most of these studies use coded legislative statements (Jenkins-Smith,
St. Clair, and Woods 1991; Jenkins-Smith and St. Clair 1993; Sabatier and Brasher 1993;
Zafonte and Sabatier 2004; Pierce 2011; Nohrstedt 2010), with a few studies using survey
and interviews (Weible, Sabatier, and McQueen 2009; Ingold 2011) and discourse analysis
(Leifeld 2013). Important in these studies is the documentation that although coalitions are
generally stable over time defection is not uncommon and membership often changes.
Analysts have documented a range of reasons for defection or change in coalition
composition, such as extreme coalition actors defecting to prevent the adoption of
“balanced” policies (Munro 1993, 126); major internal or external events that switch
allegiances, especially elections (Jenkins-Smith, St. Clair, and Woods 1991; Zafonte and
Sabatier 2004; Pierce 2011); and strategic decisions by coalition actors to achieve shortterm political objectives (Nohrstedt 2005; Larsen, Vrangbaek, and Traulsen 2006). To
further develop Coalition Hypothesis 1, the next steps must develop and test a range of
theoretical rationales for the stability or instability of coalitions.
The testing of Coalition Hypotheses 2 and 3 has resulted in only a few confirmations
(Weyant 1988; Elliot and Schlaepfer 2001; Kim 2003) but many falsifications and, at best,
findings of partial support (Barke 1993; Jenkins-Smith and St. Clair 1993; Sabatier and
Brasher 1993; Olson, Olson, and Gawronski 1999; Sobeck 2003; Larsen, Vrangbaek, and
Traulsen 2006; Ingold 2011; Zafonte and Sabatier 2004). There are at least two
interpretations for the mixed support for Coalition Hypotheses 2 and 3. The first
interpretation involves variation in conceptualizations and measurement of belief systems
in establishing coalitions. If this interpretation is correct, there needs to be a concerted effort
to clarify the theoretical distinction between policy core and secondary aspects as well as
methodological guidelines for measurement. Olson, Olson, and Gawronski (1999), for
example, found it difficult to isolate policy core beliefs from secondary aspects. The second
interpretation points to a faulty or imprecise model of the belief system and overall logic of
Coalition Hypotheses 2 and 3. To put it simply, even if analysts could adequately measure
and distinguish policy core and secondary aspects, perhaps Coalition Hypotheses 2 and 3 are
wrong. Although we are not in a position in this chapter to reject both hypotheses, we
underscore the mixed support for them and draw attention to a need for better approaches
in conceptualizing and measuring belief systems in the ACF.
The fourth and fifth hypotheses are rarely tested in the ACF. Evidence supporting the
Coalition Hypothesis 4 remains mixed, with some evidence offering confirmation (JenkinsSmith, St. Clair, and Woods 1991; Jenkins-Smith and St. Clair 1993) and others providing only
partial to no support (Sabatier and Brasher 1993). The most important confirmation for
Coalition Hypothesis 5 remains Jenkins-Smith, St. Clair, and Woods (1991) and JenkinsSmith and St. Clair (1993). The implication from this assessment is clear enough: there is a
need for renewed testing and development of Coalition Hypotheses 4 and 5.
Although it is not a traditional hypothesis, a large number of studies have tested the
expectation that coalitions form on the basis of shared beliefs, known as the Belief
Homophily Hypothesis. Studies confirming this hypothesis can be found in a number of
publications, including Weible (2005), Matti and Sandström (2011), Henry (2011), Ingold
(2011), and Leifeld (2013). Whereas the results tend to confirm the Belief Homophily
Hypothesis, the findings raise two new implications for studying coalitions under the ACF.
The first implication is the presence of other factors, outside of beliefs, that affect coalition
formation and stability. These other factors include, but are not limited to, perceived
influence or resources of others (Weible 2005; Matti and Sandström 2011), interests
(Nohrstedt 2010), and trust (Henry, Lubell, and McCoy 2011). The second implication is that
coalitions are shaped more by sharing opponents than by sharing beliefs (Henry, Lubell, and
McCoy 2011). Research on the Belief Homophily Hypothesis supports the argument that
beliefs remain a major factor in forming and maintaining coalitions, but other factors clearly
have an effect, and the precise role of beliefs in shaping coalitions needs theoretical
refinement.
The traditional hypotheses about coalitions highlight some of the theoretical logic about
coalitions and many of the most important concepts. However, the theoretical argument
about coalitions is broader than is articulated in the listed hypotheses and sometimes
includes additional concepts and their interrelations, some of which are summarized below
in four categories.
• Dominant and minority coalitions. Although some subsystems exhibit advocacy
coalitions steeped in conflict marked by long periods of ongoing one-upmanship, other
subsystems exhibit a “dominant” coalition that largely controls (most likely through
resource superiority) subsystem politics and policy, and either a “minority” coalition
vying for influence or the absence of any coordinated opposition. Even though a
number of studies have documented the stability of dominant advocacy coalitions in
steering a policy subsystem, the attributes of various coalitions remain
underdeveloped, particularly the comparison of beliefs, resources, strategies, and
activities.
• Overcoming threats to collective action. One of the critical theoretical arguments that
has yet to be sufficiently developed involves how coalitions overcome threats to
collective action (Schlager 1995). Actors form coalitions and overcome threats to
collective action on the basis of three rationales (Zafonte and Sabatier 1998; Sabatier
and Weible 2007, 197). First, similar beliefs among allies reduce the transaction costs
for coordination. Second, actors are involved in policy subsystems at different levels of
intensity and, thus, some engage in weak forms of coordination (sharing information)
and others in strong forms of coordination (jointly developing and executing shared
plans). Third, actors often experience the devil shift and, therefore, exaggerate the
costs of inaction and the need for action (Sabatier, Hunter, and McLaughlin 1987).
• Principal and auxiliary coalition actors. Network analysis techniques have shown that
some coalition actors are more central to a coalition than others and that sometimes
actors rarely interact with their allies. To account for this variation in coalition
membership, a distinction is made between actors who are principal and those who
are auxiliary to a coalition (Larsen, Vrangbaek, and Traulsen 2006; Silva 2007; Zafonte
and Sabatier 2004; Weible 2008). Principal actors are expected to be more central and
consistent coalition members, whereas auxiliary actors are expected to be on the
periphery, involved intermittently or sometimes only for a short period of time, and
therefore not as regularly engaged in coalition-related activities.
• Resources, strategies, and activities. Coalitions are marked not only by shared beliefs
and coordination patterns but also by their resources. These resources include formal
legal authority to make policy decisions, public opinion, information, mobilizable
supporters, financial resources, and skillful leadership (Sabatier and Weible 2007;
Weible 2007; Nohrstedt 2011; Ingold 2011; Albright 2011; Elgin and Weible 2013).
Resources are an important contribution that provide the theoretical leverage for
understanding the capacity of a coalition to make strategic decisions and engage in
various activities to influence policy subsystems.
Overall, the support for the study of coalitions is strong for Coalition Hypothesis 1 and for
the Belief Homophily Hypothesis, mixed for Coalition Hypotheses 2 and 3 that involve the
hierarchical belief systems in the ACF, and mostly untested for Coalition Hypotheses 4 and
5. Several underdeveloped areas within this theoretical emphasis involve the role of
coalition resources, strategies, and activities; the role and type of coalition members; the
testing of the argument involving the collective action rationale for the formation of
coalitions; and the continued development of dominant and minority coalitions.
Policy-Oriented Learning
Policy-oriented learning is one prominent pathway within the ACF for the explanation of
policy change and plays a central role in belief change and reinforcement of members of
advocacy coalitions. If it has always been of central focus within the ACF, it is possibly still
the most intractable concept to study (Bennett and Howlett 1992; Levy 1994). Policyoriented learning is defined as “enduring alternations of thought or behavioral intentions
that result from experience and which are concerned with the attainment or revision of the
precepts of the belief system of individuals or of collectives” (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith
1993, 42). Learning is associated with changes in beliefs systems of coalition members that
include not only the understanding of a problem and associated solutions but also the use of
political strategies for achieving objectives (see May 1992). Some of the important questions
in the study of learning include: What belief system components change or remain the same
through learning? What contexts foster learning by coalition members? How does learning
diffuse among allies and possibly among opponents? What is the role, if any, of policy brokers
in facilitating learning among opponents?
The theory underlying learning in the ACF emphasizes four categories of explanatory
factors.
• Attributes of forums. Forums are the venues where coalitions interact, debate, and
possibly negotiate. Jenkins-Smith (1982, 1990, 99–103) makes the theoretical
argument about how the attributes of a forum, essentially the forum’s institutional
arrangement, affect the extent that learning occurs among allies and opponents. A
couple of the most important attributes defining a forum are the degree of openness in
participating (open vs. closed forums) and the extent that participating actors share a
common analytical training and norms of conduct.
• Level of conflict between coalitions. Level of conflict relates to the extent that actors
perceive a threat to their policy core beliefs from their opponents’ objectives or
actions. Jenkins-Smith (1990, 95–97) and Weible (2008) essentially argue for an
inverted quadratic relationship between level of conflict and learning between
members of opposing coalitions, which has been called “cross-coalition learning.” At
low levels of conflict, there is little cross-coalition learning because coalition actors
attend to other subsystem affairs. At high levels of conflict, there is also little crosscoalition learning because coalition actors defend their positions and reject
information that disputes their belief systems. At intermediate levels of conflict,
opposing coalitions are threatened just enough to attend to the issue and remain
receptive enough to new information to increase the likelihood for cross-coalition
learning.
• Attributes of the stimuli. Attributes of the stimuli relates to the type of information and
experience coalition actors are exposed to. Jenkins-Smith (1990, 97–99) argues that
analytically intractable phenomena involve uncertainty, low-quality data, and, hence,
variation in interpretation and high levels of disagreement. The more intractable an
issue, the lower the level of cross-coalition learning expected.
• Attributes of actors. Attributes of the individual actors include their belief system,
resources, strategies, and network contacts. Given the importance of belief systems in
filtering and interpreting information, for example, the expectation is that coalition
actors with extreme beliefs are less likely to learn from opponents than are coalition
actors with more moderate beliefs. Additionally, some actors can serve as policy
brokers who primarily seek to mitigate the level of conflict and help opponents reach
agreements (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993, 27). There are no predetermined
criteria defining who can or cannot be a broker within a subsystem; indeed, a broker
could be affiliated with any organization type, from academia to government to the
private or nonprofit sector. One important role for brokers is facilitating learning
among opponents (Ingold and Varone 2012).
These four attributes can be found in the following five hypotheses on policy- oriented
learning within the ACF:
Learning Hypothesis 1. Policy-oriented learning across belief systems is most likely when
there is an intermediate level of informed conflict between the two coalitions. This
requires that: (1) each has the technical resources to engage in such a debate, and (2)
the conflict is between secondary aspects of one belief system and core elements of the
other or, alternatively, between important secondary aspects of the two belief systems.
Learning Hypothesis 2. Policy-oriented learning across belief systems is most likely when
there exists a forum that is: (1) prestigious enough to force professionals from
different coalitions to participate and (2) dominated by professional norms.
Learning Hypothesis 3. Problems for which accepted quantitative data and theory exist are
more conducive to policy-oriented learning across belief systems than those in which
data and theory are generally qualitative, quite subjective, or altogether lacking.
Learning Hypothesis 4. Problems involving natural systems are more conducive to policyoriented learning across belief systems than those involving purely social or political
systems because in the former many of the critical variables are not themselves active
strategists and because controlled experimentation is more feasible.
Learning Hypothesis 5. Even when the accumulation of technical information does not
change the views of the opposing coalition, it can have important impacts on policy—
at least in the short run—by altering the views of policy brokers.
Studies of policy-oriented learning have not always supported these hypotheses. A good
number of studies have documented learning at both secondary (expected) and policy core
(not expected) levels of the belief system (Sabatier and Brasher 1993; Eberg 1997; Elliot and
Schlaepfer 2001; Larsen, Vrangbaek, and Traulsen 2006). These results echo the mixed
support for Coalition Hypotheses 2 and 3. That is, the hierarchical belief system of the ACF—
especially the distinction between policy core and secondary aspects—is not finding strong
support in many of the hypothesis tests.
In support of Learning Hypothesis 3, Sotirov and Memmler (2012) find in their review of
the literature that a handful of studies show that learning was limited when data were
lacking or were of qualitative or subjective nature (e.g., Weyant 1988; Elliot and Schlaepfer
2001; Nedergaard 2008), but the findings also show the same for situations for learning
using quantitative data (Elliot and Schlaepfer 2001; Kim 2003).
Studies have found that learning is more likely to occur with tractable issues, with
intermediate levels of conflict, and with the availability of scientific and technical
information (Larsen, Vrangbaek, and Traulsen 2006; Meijerink 2005; Elliott and Schlaepfer
2001). Providing indirect support for learning within the ACF, Leach et al. (2013) find forum
structure, attributes of the individual learner, and level of scientific certainty affected belief
change and knowledge acquisition. This is an area in need of renewed theoretical and
empirical attention.
One promising direction of research involves development of the policy broker concept
(Ingold and Varone, 2012). This work finds support for Learning Hypothesis 5 and identifies
some systematic evidence that certain actor types are more likely to play the broker role
than others. These actors are not acting in an altruistic way: to engage in a brokerage role,
they need a certain level of self-interest and an awareness of the potential benefits from
policy compromise or the potential losses from the status quo.
Across many of the applications of learning, the most pressing concern is the inconsistency
in conceptualization and measurement of the concept. And similarly to the change
hypotheses, what also needs to be addressed in this theoretical emphasis is a set of best
practices for studying learning within and across advocacy coalitions. There must also be a
fresh look at the factors that shape learning, including levels of conflict, attributes of the
actor, the role of policy brokers, nature of stimuli, and characteristics of the forum.
A FUTURE RESEARCH AGENDA
The future trajectory of the ACF depends on the innovative and creative efforts of numerous
analysts from around the world. Nonetheless, we offer a research agenda for analysts to
consider in moving the framework forward.
Reconsider the ACF’s belief system. Empirical applications of the ACF suggest that the belief
system model needs to be further specified. There are many ways forward, including
clarifying the distinction between policy core and secondary beliefs, combining the policy
core beliefs and secondary beliefs into a single category under deep core beliefs, and drawing
inspiration from other theories, such as the value-belief-norm theory (Stern 2000; Henry
and Dietz 2012), cultural theory (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014),
and Narrative Policy Framework (Shanahan, Jones, and McBeth 2011).
Advance the theory and measures of learning. Despite its centrality to the framework,
conceptual development of policy-oriented learning—including causes, kinds of learning,
and implications—is among the least mature components of the ACF. Analysts are
encouraged to undertake reexamination of this concept within the framework as well as the
theoretical implications. Research in this domain should emphasize clear conceptualization
and measurement of various products of learning and the processes by which it is
encouraged and inhibited (Heikkila and Gerlak 2013).
Refine the theory of coalition structures and coordination. The study of coalitions remains
a staple of the framework, and significant advances in understanding coalitions have
occurred over the past decade, particularly with network analysis techniques (Henry 2011).
This effort should continue with special attention to the assumed hierarchy of belief
homophily and coordination patterns among coalition members (Calanni et al. 2015; Ingold
and Fischer 2014). It also needs to focus on the sources of stability of coalitions, with
attention to the likelihood and reasons for defection by coalition members.
Develop a hierarchy for coalition resources. The ACF assumes that access to and
exploitation of various political resources are important for advocacy coalitions as they seek
to influence public policy. Following Sewell (2005) and Sabatier and Weible (2007, 201–
204), we encourage efforts to identify a typology of political resources that includes formal
legal authority to make policy decisions, public opinion, information, mobilizable troops,
financial resources, and skillful leadership. Although coalition resources were long neglected
in empirical research (Sabatier and Weible 2007, 201), recent studies have investigated how
coalitions mobilize and exploit resources in the policy process (Albright 2011; Ingold 2011).
These studies confirm that redistribution of political resources is an important step in
explaining policy change. Meanwhile, as suggested by Nohrstedt (2011, 480), some
resources are more important than others for coalitions to achieve influence, which is
ultimately given by governing system attributes such as constitutional rules. For example,
having coalition actors in positions of legal authority is a major resource because legislators
are veto players whose agreement is needed for policy change (Tsebelis 1995; see also
Sabatier and Pelkey 1987). Legal authority is also one defining element of a dominant
coalition, which has more of its allies in positions of formal authority than do minority
coalitions (Sabatier and Weible 2007, 203). Resources could therefore be hierarchically
arranged with regard to their perceived usefulness and effectiveness to coalitions, which in
turn raises challenges and questions for future research (Weible et al. 2011, 356–357). For
example, under what conditions are some resources more important than others for
coalitions to gain influence? Which strategies do coalitions utilize to select which resources
to exploit? What is the relative importance of specific kinds of resources in different political
systems? How does redistribution of resources influence policy change and learning? A
related challenge is to advance approaches to operationalize resources by, for example,
network analysis (Ingold 2011) and qualitative research (Mintrom and Vergari 1996;
Nohrstedt 2011).
Study venues and forums within policy subsystems. The focus of the ACF on policy
subsystems has important impacts on conducting research. However, some notable
applications of the ACF have focused on organizational-level analysis, especially in the area
of collaborative partnerships (Leach and Sabatier 2005; Leach et al. 2013). For example,
Leach and Sabatier (2005) applied the ACF in the study of watershed partnerships. These
partnerships, however, do not encapsulate the entire policy subsystem but rather involve a
single venue within the subsystem. As a result, the study of the partnership represents
a selected sample of subsystem actors choosing to participate in the partnership. Such
organizational-level applications of the ACF are encouraged because we gain a deeper
understanding of how coalition actors learn from each other and negotiate agreements.
Additionally, because coalitions seek to affect government decisions through venues, the
choice of one venue over another remains an important topic of study.
Use the ACF for comparative public policy research. Most comparative work on the ACF
has been based on implicit comparison across political- institutional systems. Few empirical
studies based on the ACF systematically compare policy subsystems, coalition behavior, and
policy processes across political systems (Gupta 2012). One is an ACF study applied in seven
countries (Canada, France, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the
United States) that compares the policies and regulations related to oil and gas development
using hydraulic fracturing (Weible et al. 2016). Using different methods of data collection
and analyses, the same research questions about advocacy coalitions and the propensity for
policy change were asked and answered. The comparison confirmed the importance of
subsystem properties for explaining differences observed across the seven countries (Ingold
et al. 2016). Not only do basic institutional and constitutional arrangements of the political
system decisively affect coalition formation and the propensity for policy change but also
subsystem attributes (such as jurisdictional level, maturity, or autonomy) and issue
characteristics (such as salience and potential threat to certain values within the belief
system) do as well. We encourage future work in this direction, developing systematic
comparisons of policy subsystems across countries to disentangle the factors accounting for
advocacy coalitions, policy-oriented learning, and policy change.
The expansion of applications to new countries is a trend that can inspire future
comparison across systems. Comparative work obviously brings additional costs in terms of
data acquisition and analysis but also important gains in terms of new insights regarding the
role of political institutions and cultures in shaping the formation, maintenance, and
behavior of advocacy coalitions in the policy process. Here is a gap waiting to be filled.
Fruitful avenues for future comparative work involve vicarious policy-oriented learning
(how coalitions learn from the experience of others) and policy transfer (how policies diffuse
from one political system to another) (Bandura 1962; Dolowitz and Marsh 1996). Following
the emphasis on coalition opportunity structures (Kübler 2001; Sabatier 1998; Sabatier and
Weible 2007), there is also a need to investigate how specific institutional attributes such as
veto players, the required level of consensus, and system openness shape coalition
interaction and policy change (Fischer 2015; Gupta 2013). Empirical research in these areas
would yield important insights about the policy process and expose questions and areas for
future research, including the role and importance of advocacy coalitions as a type of political
organization actors exploit to coordinate strategies and gain influence. Although
comparative analysis is a long-term challenge and will probably generate limited
generalizability in the short term given the complexity of the policy process (Schmitt 2012),
the ACF offers concepts and assumptions that should stimulate and facilitate comparative
analysis.
Focus on types of actors, including auxiliary and principal coalition actors, policy
brokers, and policy entrepreneurs. Exceptional actors often play critical roles in policy
subsystems. Some of these actors could be principal coalition actors but possibly auxiliary
coalition actors. Other categories are policy brokers (Ingold and Varone 2012) and policy
entrepreneurs (Mintrom 2009; Mintrom and Vergari 1996). From its earliest renditions, the
ACF has suggested that brokers can play important roles in policy-oriented learning
(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993), and empirical applications have provided some evidence
on brokers’ impact on policy outputs (Ingold and Varone 2012; Ingold 2011). But further
research is needed to theoretically and empirically refine the role of brokers in policy
subsystems in general (Christopoulos and Ingold 2015) and in the design of learning
mechanisms in particular. Policy entrepreneurs might also be critical players in maintaining
coalitions and causal drivers of policy change, but few have analyzed this type of exceptional
actor in ACF studies.
Focus on nascent and mature policy subsystems. Most studies of the ACF focus on mature
policy subsystems. In mature policy subsystems, policy actors have typically fortified their
belief systems about the risks and benefits associated with an issue, they interact in stable
advocacy coalitions, and conflicts among opponents have endured over time both within and
across decision making venues. Sometimes, mature policy subsystems absorb new issues as
they emerge on the political agenda, whereas on other occasions new issues provoke the
formation of a new policy subsystem (Nohrstedt and Olofsson 2016a). Unfortunately, few
scholars have studied nascent policy subsystems (Ingold, Fischer, and Cairney 2016; Stritch
2015; Beverwijk, Goedegebuure, and Huisman 2008). As a result, theoretical insights about
nascent subsystems remain underdeveloped. Speculatively, nascent policy subsystems are
likely to feature policy actors with ambiguous perceptions of the risk and benefits of a policy
issue, unclear preferences for known policy solutions, and unstable alliances among allies
and opponents. Studies on nascent subsystems could yield insights about the initial
conditions of policy subsystem characteristics, the process of coalition formation, the
establishment of interactions within and across coalitions, and the role of coalitions in
agenda setting. A focus on nascent policy subsystems will allow scholars to adopt a
prospective approach (e.g., how does the variation in initial conditions in nascent policy
subsystems give rise to differences in conditions in mature policy subsystems?), help
identify the reasons for nascent subsystem formation (e.g., in response to a crisis, a policy
change, or other), and assist in investigating the propensity for future policy change (Weible
et al. 2016).
Expand our understanding of science and policy analysis in the policy process. The ACF
was originally created to help inform the role of scientists and science in the policy process.
Several recent publications address this area. Much of this work began with Jenkins-Smith’s
(1990) theoretical and empirical efforts in studying the role of policy analysis in the policy
process. Since then the effort has shifted mostly to the roles of scientists and technicians and
scientific and technical information in the policy process (Jenkins-Smith and Weimer 1985;
Weible 2008; Silva and Jenkins-Smith 2007; Silva, Jenkins-Smith, and Barke 2007; Weible,
Sabatier, and Pattison 2010; Montpetit 2011; Lundin and Öberg 2014). This research
strongly suggests that the use of science and policy analysis is driven by the level of conflict
in the policy subsystem (Jenkins-Smith 1990; Weible 2008). The next step is to test these
expectations under different conditions and develop a coherent theoretical explanation for
the findings.
Establish common methods of data collection and analyses for applying the framework,
identify trade-offs in using different methods, and promote contextually based
theoretical innovations. The ACF is a tool for comparative analyses of policy processes. To
foster comparative work, there is a need to develop common methods of collecting and
analyzing data given common research questions. Clearly, some methods of data collection
and analysis are more suitable in some contexts than in others (e.g., online surveys vs.
interviews). Similarly, other methods of data collection and analysis are feasible when
directly comparing policy subsystems over time (e.g., newspaper content analysis). The best
strategy is not to promote one method of data collection and analysis over another but rather
to utilize the best methods given the research questions, contexts, and resources of the
researchers. To support such an effort, researchers must recognize the trade-offs of different
approaches and, ideally, combine more than one to capture their respective strengths and
compensate for their weaknesses.
Explore the need for theoretical refinement emanating from application in
nontraditional settings. Underlying the need for comparative methods is a simultaneous
need for contextually based theoretical development. The majority of empirical applications
of the ACF involves cases of mature policy subsystems marked by high conflict in heavily
democratized political systems (Weible et al. 2016; Pierce et al. 2017). Application of the ACF
to nascent subsystems, to policy subsystems marked by low or moderate levels of conflict,
or to policy subsystems within different types of political systems is less frequent and might
require theoretical innovations and adjustments. Prior comparative work on the ACF outside
the United States and Western Europe reports strengths as well as weaknesses; studies
confirm the applicability of the ACF’s concepts and assumptions, and they identify
limitations related to descriptive and explanatory validity (Henry et al. 2014). Although
some of these limitations (as discussed above in this chapter) apply more broadly, scholars
should also identify limitations that are related to the attributes of policy processes in (for
example) hybrid or authoritarian regimes. Ascertaining how the ACF might be adapted to
address this expanded array of contexts (without altering the framework’s axiomatic
propositions) and how the ACF fares compared to alternative frameworks are important
questions for the future.14
CONCLUSION
Our intent in this chapter is to provide an overview of the ACF research program. The
framework has attracted worldwide attention and scholarship over several decades, and we
readily acknowledge that in this short chapter we have not been able to adequately
incorporate all of the important theoretical and empirical contributions. To supplement this
chapter, we highly recommend the excellent theoretical and methodological insights that can
be found in Fischer (2015) on the role of institutions on coalition formation, in Sotirov and
Memmler (2012) on the ACF in environmental and natural resource contexts, and in Leifeld
(2013) on discourse coalitions. In addition, some of the best emerging work can be found in
recent PhD dissertations (Gupta 2013; Valman 2014; Donadelli 2016). The continuing
growth of ACF scholarship gives us some confidence that—over thirty years after its initial
articulation—the framework is still undergoing progressive problem-shift.
We conclude this chapter with a challenge. Although the ACF has spawned a fruitful
research program on coalitions, learning, and policy change, we must raise the question:
What ends will ACF research serve? Clearly, analysts applying the ACF must continue to use
the best science available to improve and develop the framework and to seek answers to
some of the most pressing puzzles about policy processes. But some analysts must also work
toward developing the framework as a tool for informing and, possibly, improving actual
policy processes. To what extent can the framework be used as a policy analysis tool for
informing decisions (Nohrstedt 2013; Weible, 2007)? Can the logic of the framework help
people strategically influence the policy process (Weible et al. 2012)? And can we eventually
draw lessons from the framework to inform what may enhance (or undercut) the capacities
of a policy process for the betterment of society? We do not have answers to these questions,
but we encourage new and experienced analysts to take them on.
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