Kim Moloney, Ph.D. NGOs & Global Governance • 26 Dec 2004 • 9.0 on the Richter scale. • 620 mile (997 km) tectonic plate shifted. • Wave speeds of 500 mph (840 kmh) hit Sri Lanka. • Fault lines must be underwater for earthquake to generate tsunami. • Earthquake causes seafloor to move (up to several meters) and often over a large area. • This can generate a tsunami. Ocean lifts up and waves follow. • Tsunami waves can travel up to 500 mph. • Put another way, a tsunami wave can travel from one side of the Pacific Ocean to the other in less than a day. From Indonesia & Thailand (December 2004) Banda Aceh (Dec 2004) – *Minutes 0:40 to 6:20 is Banda Aceh, Indonesia; 7:30 to 9:04 is Phuket, Thailand, see: www.youtube.com/watch?v=UMQEgJR0FcA Phuket, Thailand (Dec 2004): www.youtube.com/watch?v=uAB4zvMlhNo (*9:05); From Japan (March 2011) Note: There are many Dec 2004 tsunami videos online. However, in my opinion, none show how a tsunami can actually destroy so quickly and with such clarity as this unrelated 2011 video from Japan. I have found no similarly concise footage from 2004: ▪www.youtube.com/watch?v=ceym2c18OQM&feature=fvwrel (5:46) ▪www.youtube.com/watch?v=J2hUwFo6Vpc (5:38)  227,898 people confirmed dead (region-wide).  Banda Aceh was >125,000 of total. ▪ Note: May 2003 to Dec 2004, Banda Aceh also had 125,000 internally- displaced persons (IDPs) as a result of war between the Indonesian military and the Free Aceh movement.  4th largest death toll from an earthquake in recorded history.  Region-wide (all countries) IDPs of 1.7 million due to earthquake.  Countries Impacted: As far-ranging as India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Maldives, Myanmar, Seychelles, Somalia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand  Ninety-two (92) countries provided disaster assistance.  World donations: $13.6 billion  The US contributed $2.33 billion (~17% of world total). USG pledged $857 million. Citizen and corporate contributions were $1.48 billion. Humanitarian Response Outpaces Country-Specific Giving for Other Disasters: •“As of Nov 30, 2005, 84 percent of the financial needs for the UN tsunami appeal had been met, whereas the 25 other UN consolidated appeals for 2005 were funded at an average of only 30 percent” (Inderfurth, et al, 2005, p. 6).  The disaster had a high world profile. All NGOs wanted to be involved. It is a “legitimizing” activity for a NGO.  Significant $ resources made available. ▪ NGOs must justify their investment/activities. ▪ NGOs must show how they have intervened. ▪ It may not be about being effective but rather, being seen to be effective. ▪ “intervene in ways which these ‘stakeholders’ would recognize as being ‘relief’” (Stirrat, 2006, 13). ▪ “Best” if visible, photogenic, and focused on poor, women, children. “The problem for most NGOs was to find ways of spending their money. As part of my job I was asked by my team leader to try to spend £5 million as fast as possible. Given the number of NGOs and the amount of money they had at their disposal this was not surprising: after all, there were only a limited number of ‘beneficiaries’ and only a certain area of land which had been affected by the tsunami. The result was that first comers tended to carve out their territories both spatially and in terms of activities. Thus in the Matara region, repair of fishing craft was taken over by an Irish NGO called GOAL, while the International Organization for Migration dominated temporary housing. Any piece of land which could be used sported an IOM signboard, an effective statement that other organizations should keep out. NGO representatives openly talked of ‘carving out territories’ along the coastal strip. Moving into an area already occupied by another NGO involved careful negotiation” (Stirrat, 2008, 13).  Competition to get rid of the money and to do so “in the ‘right’ way which would fit with Western donors’ visions of what relief should be” (Stirrat, 2008, 13).  NGO accountability to whom? NGOs clearing their actions with HQ. To whom is the NGO HQ more accountable? Citizen or corporate donors? How the NGO’s actions are viewed by bilateral donors? Or accountable to the local victims? Which is most important? Do we know? Does our answer matter?  Many small, newly-formed, foreign NGOs were everywhere. Many had little experience in disaster relief or in South Asia. What better way to justify your new existence (and to secure more funding) than to do something highly visible? Or not? One impact was that this left fewer visible projects for the bigger NGOs.  Low-experience NGOs were more susceptible to local “redirection” of aid (read: corruption, bribery)  Duplication (Indian and Pakistani NGOs in competition. They created two hospitals within miles of each other.)  There has been a growth in worldwide civil society activity since the early 1980s.  Is this “proof” of our “liberal” world order? We have, perhaps, created this global civil society as a reflection of our shared liberal values. Such values are focused upon human rights, humanitarian relief, environmentalism, cooperation, etc.  But are the tsunami relief actions really proof of this liberal order? Stirrat (16) writes, “the world of NGOs is a world of extreme competition for resources and that organizational continuity depends upon success in this competitive world. This in turn leads to major dysfunctions and contradictions in terms of the effectiveness of aid and disaster relief.”  Or is what matters that eventually most affected persons received aid even if our distribution was occasionally plagued by problems? Post-Genocide (Rwanda) Refugee Camps Goma Camp (DROC): Competition to obtain any resources. A few NGOs answered to several major donors. Post-Tsunami Project Aid Competition to spend resources. Hundreds of NGOs answered to millions of small donors watching via media. Immediate relief 1. ▪ ▪ Prevention of a “2nd tsunami” (prevention of epidemic outbreaks) Relocating population to safe areas, emergency medical assistance, drinking water, dry food, cooking utensils, temporary shelter, clear and identify the dead, etc. Reconstruction and rehabilitation 2. ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ Reconstruction of housing and resettlement Rebuilding infrastructure (roads, bridges, sewer, water) Community development Income generation programs Counseling, if possible Is humanitarian aid the world’s “largest unregulated industry”? Can (or should) anyone give aid? 1. Coordination difficulties. 2. NGOs create agendas without considering local contexts. 3. Local NGOs (SNGOs) were often ignored in the first few months of recovery. Simple things like the use of English at coordinating meetings can easily exclude locals. 4. The prevalence of international NGOs also meant that local NGOs faced staff and volunteer issues as they fought to retain their local NGO staff when international NGOs often paid more. 5. Limited leadership accountability among NGOs and between NGOs and the people. 6. Problems of “too much” money. If have lots of cash, can “fly the flag” or “claim stake” and work alone as a NGO. This hampers coordination and creates duplication. In a typical relief operation, there are multiple NGOs competing for the same (often limited) donor monies. 7. Explosion of previously unknown NGOs appeared on the scene. 8. Too many NGOs (300+ descended on Aceh immediately following the tsunami). 9. The United Nations’ OCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) coordinating capability was weakened without timely NGO responses to OCHA requests. 10. Multiple assessments of the same areas, assessments often unpublished, energy wasted. 11. Focus on spending as much of donated money as quickly as possible. What was spent and what was constructed rather than whether any of those expenditures or constructions were effective. 12. Uneven distribution of aid among victims. 13. In Sri Lanka, a national database of need (and which NGOs were involved) was created 9 months after the tsunami. The problem is that the database officials also had an ability to use corrupt means. If you want to be included as providing aid, why do you have to pay a bribe?  Objective: “build back better.”  Why? Prior disasters had suggested the importance of citizen input, consideration of environmental hazards, not re-create existing vulnerabilities, create sustainable communities, etc.  Tasks: Rebuild homes plus also advocacy, strategic planning, site planning, procurement, construction management, recruitment, and training.  Examples: Habitat for Humanity, Haven Partnership, CHF International.  Sample Scale: In Tamil Nadu (India), 80% of 154,000 houses destroyed by the tsunami were owned by fishermen. Do particular parts of society have different needs than others? Do fishermen really wish to relocate miles away?  Global Communities+ Oxfam: ▪ Short Video (1:57): www.youtube.com/watch?v=OIg-J7Ao0uU ▪ “Thank You” Donor Video (2:28): www.youtube.com/watch?v=AxpQE4jPQh0&feature=endscreen&NR=1 (observe the language, tone, music)  JUB-Uplink: ▪ Part I (2:02): www.youtube.com/watch?v=AWCyeJNChYA ▪ Part II (2:02): www.youtube.com/watch?NR=1&v=HpF5S0cKjJA&feature=endscreen ▪ Part III (2:02): www.youtube.com/watch?feature=endscreen&v=nxDm57aqNE&NR=1  What is “Transitional Shelter”? ▪ Tents, camps, hastily constructed shelters. ▪ Often just one room with minimal sewage, water or electricity hook-ups.  Post-disaster transitional shelter needs: ▪ Physical (protection from outside) and psychological health (sense of home/community); ▪ Physical and psychological security; ▪ Livelihood support.  Flexibility and adaptability is required (e.g. blanket used for tent door) 1. Country contexts matter. For example, there was skilled labor in Sri Lanka, but less so in Banda Aceh. There can be delays due to beneficiary training. 2. So many NGOs with housing money (and a need to build “now”) that Aceh citizens did not want to help build their own houses. Thus, it became “build back faster” rather than “build back better”. 3. Donors required funds be spent in 6-12 months so as to match home country budget cycles or expectations rather than reality on the ground. 4. Many NGOs with limited housing experience and unable to link “building a house” with wider issues like safety or security or livelihoods. 5. How categorize people based on how they were impacted by the tsunami? Who should get housing first? Second? Last? Particularly complicated in Aceh because you also had displaced persons impacted by prior conflict between Aceh and the Indonesian military. Which victim should get priority? 6. Are persons without land rights (e.g. renters or squatters) given less priority than landowners who lost houses? 7. Desire for modern (masonry) houses rather than more seismic-proof timber houses. 8. Failed to consider import problems: wood, materials, bulldozers, etc. 9. Questions of soft wood (poorer quality, but more common) versus hardwood (better, but not enough around) 10. Skimping on material (e.g. cement) which if fully utilized would have strengthened the house foundation. Instead persons preferred to use some of the cement for decorative/status purposes. 11. If one waits too long to begin building houses, there may be a smaller available labor pool to construct the homes since many potential laborers would have re-begun their prior livelihoods. 12. In Banda Aceh, they had traditionally imported construction workers and thus many locals were reluctant to take up a strange new livelihood which might be less beneficial once the houses were completed. 13. Some consultation with locals. But how view it? If locals request Western masonry houses as symbol of “development,” where is line? 14. Is OK if beneficiaries use the new house for place of business rather than a home? Is it OK if the beneficiary moves back to the coastline where tsunami susceptibility is the highest? 15. Those provided compensation grants would received money in tranches. This meant that when a particular housing or safety stages was completed, homeowners would get money. But what if there are only a few technical inspection officers for thousands of new homes? 16. Or what if locals use compensation grants to pay off debts rather than for their housing purpose? 17. If a family receives remittances, is it OK to rebuild in less than two weeks and thus skip inspections? 18. Governance concerns: ministerial rivalry, favoritism, and corruption in the awarding construction contracts, plus problems with a lack of land for permanent housing. 19. Governance concerns: who benefits from a new house? Who gets the first house? Second house? Last house? 20. Governance concerns: “free riders” wanting new house but were not impacted by the tsunami. 1. Community involvement but not control. 2. Communicate full settlement and shelter process. This will create appropriate expectations. ▪ Define what “build back better” means. Does it mean modern? Environmentally friendly? Safe? Oriented toward livelihoods? 3. Community decision-making should involve representative genders, ages, and ethnicities. 4. NGOs must focus on wider link between their housing (whether transitional or permanent) and links to other sectors of development. IOW “think ahead” and link long-term planning with disaster risk reduction. 5. Programs should include capacity-building so as to leave behind trained people. 6. Work to move from “lessons identified” to “lessons learned”. This requires post-conflict or post-disaster discussion, training, collaboration, and understanding. 7. Adopt flexibility in housing design. Rather than assuming the donor- or government-selected house is the one that must be provided, encourage flexibility and adaptation to the local environment. 8. Measure less by “number of houses constructed” and more about whether what was constructed was truly “built back better.” Kim Moloney, Ph.D. NGOs & Global Governance • French and Creole are spoken in Haiti. • Spanish is spoken in the Dominican Republic. Note: This is a food aid map from 2008. This helps show how desperately poor Haiti was before the January 2010 earthquake.  As interested citizen in “far away” (economically, politically) Miami? ▪ No. You did this before enrolling in this class.  Or as student of NGO class? ▪ Yes. You work for a NGO. You want to “do good” “help ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ others” and/or “build a better world”, etc.. You and a team from your NGO have landed in Port-auPrince within 24 hours of the 7.0 earthquake. What do you do first? Second? Third? Fourth? What problems might arise? Will “power” or “ethics” frame your action or reactions?  CBS Sunday Morning Newscast ▪ * First five days of the crisis (10:49): www.youtube.com/watch?v=c_dMzgy3Pp4 ▪ 3-5 days for aid to begin its arrival: Intermittent food, no electricity, your home has collapsed, you are missing some of your family, ▪ Haitian man @3:07: “Too many people dying, there is no help, there is no hospital, no electricity, nothing. No food, no water, nothing. No phone, no food, no water, nothing.” ▪ Catholic Relief Services (8:42): “Logistically distribute in a secure manner…”  U.S. Coast Guard Flyover (2 days after earthquake) (2:21): www.youtube.com/watch?v=gH1oq5byI8c Presidential Palace: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/picturegalleries/worldnews/6979161/Powerful-earthquake-devastates-the-Caribbean-nation-ofHaiti.html; Petionville: http://www.boston.com/bigpicture/2010/01/earthquake_in_haiti.html One of THOUSANDS of damaged buildings: http://www.boston.com/bigpicture/2010/01/earthquake_in_haiti.html One of THOUSANDS of damaged buildings: http://www.boston.com/bigpicture/2010/01/earthquake_in_haiti.html One of THOUSANDS of damaged buildings: http://www.boston.com/bigpicture/2010/01/earthquake_in_haiti.html Man Calling Out for Help: http://www.boston.com/bigpicture/2010/01/earthquake_in_haiti.html Nighttime Rescue: http://www.boston.com/bigpicture/2010/01/earthquake_in_haiti.html Women Waiting on Hospital Floor: http://www.boston.com/bigpicture/2010/01/earthquake_in_haiti.html Before the Earthquake Haiti was 145th of 169 countries in the UN Human Development Index, lowest in the Western Hemisphere. More than 70% of people in Haiti were living on less than $US2 per day, while 55% of Haitians live on less than $1.25 per day . Imagine… all of your expenses on less than $1.25 per day... 86% 80% of people in Port au Prince lived in slums: tightly-packed, poorly-built, concrete buildings. of education in Haiti was provided in often poor-quality private schools, the state system generally provided better education but provided far too few places. Before the Earthquake Half of people in Port-au-Prince had no access to latrines. Only one-third of the people in Port-au-Prince had access to tap water. Approximately 58% of the entire Haitian population lacked access to clean water. ~40% Per of Haitian population is
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