Sexual Solipsism
University Press Scholarship Online
Oxford Scholarship Online
Sexual Solipsism: Philosophical Essays on
Pornography and Objectification
Rae Langton
Print publication date: 2009
Print ISBN-13: 9780199247066
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2011
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199247066.001.0001
Sexual Solipsism
Rae Langton (Contributor Webpage)
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199247066.003.0015
Abstract and Keywords
If solipsism is false but believed, the agent treats people as
things (objectification). If solipsism is true but not believed,
the agent treats things as people (projective animation). These
two global solipsisms have two local, sexual counterparts. In
pornography ‘the human becomes thing’ (MacKinnon's
ambiguous phrase): women are treated as things, and things
are treated as women. This chapter discusses objectification,
objective attitudes, and sadism (Kant, Herman, Strawson,
Scruton, Sartre); then asks how the two solipsisms connect. Is
it chance that in pornography, things are treated as women,
and women as things? Is there a causal connection? Or a
constitutive one (Vadas)?
Keywords: solipsism, objectification, projective animation, causal connection,
objective attitudes, sadism, Kant, Herman, Strawson, Scruton
1. Introduction
Solipsism finds its best known philosophical expression in the
predicament of Descartes's meditator, which is where we are
going to begin. But a variety of solipsisms are going to occupy
us here—more local, and sexual, counterparts of the lonely
meditator. We shall be thinking about escape from solipsism,
Page 1 of 55
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: UC - Berkeley
Library; date: 10 December 2018
Sexual Solipsism
and what Kant had to say about it (Section 2). We shall be
taking a closer look at the solipsism that bothered Kant, which
involves treating people as things, and which might be taken
to include objective attitudes, objectifying attitudes, and
sadism (Section 3). And finally, we shall look more closely at a
claim that, in pornogaphy, two sexual solipsisms are united:
things are treated as people, and people are treated as things
(Section 4).1
1.1. Two Solipsisms
Suppose I were the meditator, and the Cartesian nightmare
were the truth. The beings beneath my window, in their hats
and coats, would be mere machines. Would I treat them as
mere machines? No. I would call to them, laugh with them,
talk with them, just the same. I would treat these things as
people. But my world would be, in one way, solipsistic.
Suppose now the reverse. Suppose the Cartesian nightmare
were false, but I believed it true. The beings beneath my
window would be people, but I would treat them as machines.
Solipsism would be false, but I would act as though (p.312) it
were true. And my world would be, in a different way,
solipsistic. If both worlds are solipsistic, then one aspect of
solipsism concerns the world itself, and another concerns an
attitude to the world. One aspect concerns the nature of the
beings beneath the window: are they people? Another aspect
concerns my attitude: do I treat them as people? If one is to
avoid the solipsistic worlds, some of the beings with whom one
interacts must be people (not things); and one must treat them
as people (not as things).
1.2. Two Local Solipsisms
The two global solipsisms just described may have local
counterparts. Someone may treat some things as people.
Someone might treat a doll as if it is hungry. Someone might
treat a river as if it is angry, and can be appeased with gifts.
Someone might beg help from a statue. Someone might take
an axe to a recalcitrant motor car (there, smash, that'll teach
you, smash). Someone might treat a piece of paper as if it
were a sexually desirable, and desiring, human being. It is a
familiar, if mysterious, fact of human experience that we
project human qualities onto the inanimate, whether in games,
or fantasy, or outright mistake.
Page 2 of 55
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: UC - Berkeley
Library; date: 10 December 2018
Sexual Solipsism
What can be said about this treating of things as people?
When it involves outright mistake, it may perhaps be faulted
on grounds of rationality; but if we owe moral duties only to
people, not to things, then, at first sight, no case is obviously
to be faulted on moral grounds. I cannot really hurt a thing
that I treat as a human being, no matter how I treat it. I
cannot help or harm a statue that I treat as a friend. I cannot
help or harm the car upon which I vent my rage, though I may
damage it. Perhaps that is why the elevation of things to
persons attracts little philosophical attention, with some
exceptions.2 It is not obvious that this local solipsism is to be
condemned in the way that its global counterpart deserves,
and it may be that human life would be the poorer if no one
ever treated some things as people. Besides, the treating of
things as people is usually a rather piecemeal affair, involving
the attribution (serious or otherwise) of only some human
qualities. I might treat a statue as an especially kind and
powerful friend, but am unlikely to wonder what it had for
lunch. I might treat my car as an (p.313) appropriate target
for reactive attitudes of blame and rage, but am unlikely to
apologize to it later. I might treat things as people in some
respects, and not in others. I shall speak of this treating of
things as people, this animation of things, as a solipsism
nonetheless. In the small world of my reactive relationship
with a statue, or a car, there is only one real person. So I see
this local solipsism as a microcosm of the first global solipsism
I described: the solipsism of one who attributes (seriously or
otherwise) human qualities to an inanimate thing.
There is a second local solipsism. Someone may treat some
people as things. This reduction of people to things attracts
attention from philosophers. They say it is wrong to treat a
person as a thing, because such an attitude fails to treat the
other person as an end in herself, or because it violates the
autonomy of the other person, or because it objectifies the
other person, or because it makes an Other of the other. They
say that it fails to do justice, both morally and epistemically, to
the humanity of the person who is treated as a thing. The
treating of people as things is likewise a rather piecemeal
affair, involving only some non‐human qualities. I might treat
people as things in some respects, and not in others. I shall
speak of this treating of people as things, this objectifying of
people, as a form of solipsism nonetheless. In the small world
of an objectifying relationship, there is more than one real
Page 3 of 55
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: UC - Berkeley
Library; date: 10 December 2018
Sexual Solipsism
person: but it is, for one, as if he were the only person. So I
see this local solipsism as a microcosm of the second global
solipsism described above: the solipsism of one who ignores—
and perhaps diminishes, or destroys—some human qualities of
the person whom he treats as a thing.
Feminists too are concerned about a local solipsism. Many say
that women, in particular, are treated as things, objectified,
made Other. Mary Wollstonecraft wrote that the oppression of
women produces creatures who are ‘alluring objects’ and
‘slaves’, and that relations between men and women can be
solipsistic as a result. She wrote of ‘the man who can be
contented to live with a pretty, useful companion, without a
mind’, and said that ‘in the society of his wife he is still
alone’.3 The theme is famously developed by Simone de
Beauvoir, who says that oppression is the degradation of a free
human being into an object. (p.314)
What peculiarly signalizes the situation of woman is that
she—a free and autonomous being like all human
creatures—nevertheless finds herself living in a world
where men compel her to assume the status of the Other.
They propose to stabilize her as an object . . .
In the company of a living enigma man remains alone.
[This] is for many a more attractive experience than an
authentic relationship with a human being.4
If a failure to recognize the humanity of others amounts to a
solipsism, then one message of feminist writers is that solipsism is
not a mere problem in epistemology, but a moral and political
problem, and one we have yet to fully escape.
Page 4 of 55
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: UC - Berkeley
Library; date: 10 December 2018
Sexual Solipsism
1.3. Two Sexual Solipsisms
Among these local versions of the global solipsisms with which
I began are two that have a sexual aspect. In the first,
someone treats a thing as a human being, in a context that is
sexual; in the second, someone treats a human being as a
thing, in a context that is sexual. Feminists have been
concerned with both sexual solipsisms, and so has Kant.
First there is a solipsism of animating things. When someone
treats a thing as a human being, in a sexual context, he does
not believe outright it is a human being, but he may act as if it
were. He may talk with it, he may praise it, or blame it; he may
attribute to the thing beliefs about himself, and desires. He
may direct a range of reactive attitudes towards it. And he has
sex with it. The talk, praise, blame, belief/desire attribution, is
in some sense make‐believe. The sexual experience is not.
Perhaps the thing is a piece of paper, a doll, or, more
elaborately, the electronically created virtual being imagined
in Jeanette Winterson's novel:
If you like, you may live in a computer‐created world all
day and all night. You will be able to try out a Virtual life
with a Virtual lover. You can go into your Virtual house
and do Virtual housework, add a baby or two, even find
out if you'd rather be gay. Or single. Or straight. Why
hesitate when you could simulate?
(p.315)
And sex? Certainly. Teledildonics is the word. You will be
able to plug in your telepresence to the billion‐bundle
network of fibre optics criss‐crossing the world and join
your partner in Virtuality. Your real selves will be
wearing body suits made up of thousands of tiny tactile
detectors per square inch. Courtesy of the fibre optic
network these will receive and transmit touch. The
Virtual epidermis will be as sensitive as your own outer
layer of skin.
For myself, unreconstructed as I am, I'd rather hold you
in my arms . . . Luddite? No, I don't want to smash the
machines but neither do I want the machines to smash
me.5
Page 5 of 55
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: UC - Berkeley
Library; date: 10 December 2018
Sexual Solipsism
Technology may be catching up with the thought experiments that
philosophers, since Descartes, have half‐seriously entertained—
brains in vats, experience machines, the rest. And Winterson's
description nicely captures the liberal dream. A thousand possible
experiments in living, and cost free. The Cartesian nightmare
becomes utopia. Why not plug in from the start? Why hesitate,
when you could simulate?
In short, one sexual solipsism might involve the treating of
things as if they are human, when pornography is used as a
sexual partner. This idea is clearly present in certain feminist
discussions, and in Kant's writing, though I postpone
discussion of Kant's version until later. Catharine MacKinnon
says that the use of pornography is ‘sex between people and
things, human beings and pieces of paper, real men and unreal
women’.6 Melinda Vadas defines pornography to be ‘any object
that has been manufactured to satisfy sexual desire through
its sexual consumption or other sexual use as a woman’ where
‘as’ means ‘in the role, function, or capacity of’ a woman.7 She
says that the use of pornography is the sexual consumption of
a manufactured artifact, a thing, a piece of paper, that is
treated as a human being, and in particular, as woman. There
may well be something piecemeal about this treating of things
as if they are human that is involved in pornography: there
may be some reactive attitudes and not others, there may be a
projection of some human qualities and not others, so that
although this sexual solipsism may involve the treating of a
thing as a woman, it falls short of treating a thing as a person.
That, indeed, is a point that Vadas wants to emphasize, and we
will return to it later.
(p.316) To describe the feminist argument in this way is to
risk missing the main point, which is not that pornography
animates things, but that it objectifies women, not that
pornography elevates things to human beings, but that it
reduces human beings to things—in other words, that
pornography instantiates the second sexual solipsism. Let us
think briefly (for the moment) about what this latter solipsism
might involve.
In addition to the solipsism of animating things, there is a
solipsism of objectifying people, and this, like the first, can
have a sexual aspect. Feminists see a sexual aspect to the
treating of women as things, as the remarks from
Wollstonecraft and de Beauvoir show. Women are treated as
things, when they are treated as sex objects. What this
Page 6 of 55
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: UC - Berkeley
Library; date: 10 December 2018
Sexual Solipsism
amounts to is a matter of debate, but let us say provisionally
that in sexual contexts, women are treated as things to the
extent that women are treated as merely bodies, as merely
sensory appearances, as not free, as items that can be
possessed, as items whose value is merely instrumental.
Feminists say that women are often treated as things, in
sexual contexts, and ought not to be: the claim has a
descriptive and a normative role. Kant says that people are
often treated as things, in sexual contexts, and ought not to
be: the claim has a descriptive and normative role for him as
well. In pessimistic moments Kant suggests that sexual desire
carries, in itself, a tendency to this kind of solipsism. He says
that when a human being becomes an object of someone's
sexual desire, the ‘person becomes a thing and can be treated
and used as such’. He says, notoriously, that ‘sexual love
makes of the loved person an object of appetite; as soon as
that appetite has been stilled, the person is cast aside as one
casts away a lemon that has been sucked dry’.8 The bleakness
of Kant's descriptive claim echoes the bleakness of some
feminist claims, as Barbara Herman has noted.9
It is in the context of a general view about objectification that
the main feminist claims about pornography have their place.
The claim is that pornography, in particular, makes women
objects, helps to bring it about that women are treated as
merely bodies, merely sensory appearances, not free, as items
that can be possessed, as items whose value is merely
instrumental.
(p.317) Now MacKinnon herself says that pornography
instantiates both solipsisms, though not in quite those words.
She says that in pornography use, things are treated as
women, and women are treated as things—in pornography
use, things are animated, and women are objectified. The use
of pornography involves ‘sex between people and things,
human beings and pieces of paper, real men and unreal
women’;10 and when sex is solipsistic in one way, it becomes
solipsistic in the other:
What was words and pictures becomes, through
masturbation, sex itself. As the industry expands, this
becomes more and more the generic experience of
sex. . . . In other words, as the human becomes thing and
the mutual becomes one‐sided and the given becomes
Page 7 of 55
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: UC - Berkeley
Library; date: 10 December 2018
Sexual Solipsism
stolen and sold, objectification comes to define
femininity, and one‐sidedness comes to define mutuality,
and force comes to define consent as pictures and words
become the forms of possession and use through which
women are actually possessed and used.11
When sex is something you do with a thing, ‘the human becomes
thing’. Notice that this phrase is exactly ambiguous between the
two sexual solipsisms I have described. When MacKinnon says that
‘the human becomes thing’, she means both (a) that a pornographic
artifact is used in place of a human sexual partner, and (b) that a
human sexual partner is used as if she were a pornographic
artifact, a thing. It may be tempting to think that there is a pun
here, or an equivocation, or that MacKinnon has somehow
mistaken the one solipsism for the other. A better alternative is that
we have here a substantive claim: that there is a connection
between these two solipsisms; and that the solipsism of treating
things as people, in pornography, in some way leads to the
solipsism of treating people as things.
In these preliminary thoughts I have described two sexual
solipsisms: one of treating things as human beings, in sexual
contexts; and one of treating human beings as things, in
sexual contexts. What is involved in each of these? And might
the two be connected, generally, or in pornography? A wholly
adequate response to these questions would analyze each of
the two solipsisms in detail, firmly distinguish their moral and
epistemological dimensions, make plain their implications for
philosophy and feminism, and discover whether and exactly
how they are related. But my response, (p.318) in what
follows, is more modest. I consider in Section 3 the solipsism
of treating people as things, drawing on Kant and other
writers, and I distinguish, in a far from exhaustive taxonomy,
four kinds of object‐making attitude: objective attitudes,
objectifying attitudes, self‐objectifying attitudes, and the
attitudes of sadism. The discussion of that section is partly
interpretive (in its exploration of Kant), partly analytical (in its
distinctions between attitudes), and partly critical (in its attack
on a recent account of sadism). As for the solipsism of treating
things as people, I consider in Section 4 MacKinnon's
suggestion that there is a connection between solipsism of the
one kind and solipsism of the other, and that through
pornography ‘the human becomes thing’ in more ways than
one.
First, though, let us turn our thoughts to escape.
Page 8 of 55
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: UC - Berkeley
Library; date: 10 December 2018
Sexual Solipsism
2. Escape From Solipsism
Descartes said that the path to solipsism, and hopefully
beyond, required the temporary abandoning of practical life.
The meditator should leave his normal activities, since the task
before him ‘does not involve action’.12 He should leave, for the
moment, his friends. Imagine how disquieting it would
otherwise be for the friend. Imagine what it would be like to
meet the solipsist. Imagine how it would feel to converse with
someone, hitherto my friend, who seriously entertains the
hypothesis that I, in my hat and coat, am a mere machine.
Imagine how it would feel to converse with someone who
seriously entertains the hypothesis that thoughts are being
constantly inserted into his mind by a malevolent spirit—that
the thoughts which I myself put in his mind (using a traditional
technique known as ‘speech’) have their source in the actions
of the same malevolent spirit. It would be disquieting, to say
the least. Better leave behind ones friends, or one is unlikely
to be left with many.
2.1. Kant on Friendship and Sexual Love
If an effective remedy for (and proof against?) solipsism can be
found, it is in practice, and one remedy is in friendship itself.
Kant suggests that friendship provides escape from solipsism.
He describes the man without a (p.319) friend as if he were
the Cartesian meditator. The man without a friend is the man
who is all alone, who ‘must shut himself up in himself’, who
must remain ‘completely alone with his thoughts as in a
prison’.13 Kant says that friendship provides ‘release’ from the
‘prison’ of the self, and that we have a duty ‘not to isolate
ourselves’, but to seek release from the prison of self by
seeking out friendship. Kant says, in short, that we have a
moral duty to escape solipsism.
In friendship the reciprocity characteristic of moral relations
in general is present in a distinctive way: friendship is ‘the
maximum reciprocity of love’, an ‘intimate union of love and
respect’, an ideal of ‘emotional and practical concern’ for
another's welfare.14 In her illuminating discussion of Kant's
views on friendship, Christine Korsgaard notes the metaphors
of self‐surrender and retrieval in Kant's description of
reciprocity.15 Kant says, of an ideal friendship,
Page 9 of 55
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: UC - Berkeley
Library; date: 10 December 2018
Sexual Solipsism
Suppose that I choose only friendship, and that I care
only for my friend's happiness in the hope that he cares
for mine. Our love is mutual; there is complete
restoration. I, from generosity, look after his happiness
and he similarly looks after mine; I do not throw away
my happiness, but surrender it to his keeping, and he in
turn surrenders his into my hands.16
The escape from the prison of the self is bought, in part, by a
surrender of the self—a surrender that is no one‐sided abdication,
but a generous gift offered and reciprocated. The friendships of
practical life do not achieve this ideal of reciprocity, but friendships
aim for that ideal, in Kant's opinion, and can sometimes approach
it.
Since friendship is an escape from solipsism, it has aspects
that are both practical and epistemic. If I am to respect the
beliefs and intentions of my friend, I must learn what those
beliefs and intentions are. If I am to share his goals, I must
learn what they are. If I am to bring him happiness, I must
learn what his desires are. And if our love and respect is
reciprocal, he must know the same about me. That is why Kant
says that one needs epistemic (p.320) virtues to pursue the
moral life: one must exercise an ‘active power’ of sympathy, a
practically oriented capacity that provides one with knowledge
of the beliefs and desires and feelings of others as a means of
‘participating actively’ in their fate.17 In friendship this
capacity is especially necessary, since the duty of friendship is
in part a duty to know and to make oneself known. The best
kind of friendship involves ‘the complete confidence of two
persons in revealing their secret thoughts and feelings to each
other’18 Kant says that because of the basic human need to
‘unburden our heart’,
. . . each of us needs a friend, one in whom we can
confide unreservedly, and to whom we can disclose
completely all our dispositions and judgments, from
whom we can and need hide nothing, to whom we can
communicate our whole self.19
If friendship provides an escape from solipsism, and there can be
sexual solipsisms, we can conclude that not all sexual relations are
friendly—but we are left wondering about the relation between sex
and friendship.
Kant, in optimistic mood, writes that friendship and sexual
love can provide the same escape from solipsism, and that
Page 10 of 55
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: UC - Berkeley
Library; date: 10 December 2018
Sexual Solipsism
sexual love can be as potent as friendship in its capacity to
unlock the ‘prison’ of the self.
Love, whether it is for a spouse or for a friend . . . wants
to communicate itself completely, and it expects of its
respondent a similar sharing of heart, unweakened by
distrustful reticence.
Whether it is for a spouse, or for a friend, love
presupposes the same mutual esteem for the other's
character.20
This is from Kant's letter to Maria von Herbert, a young woman
who believes she has been abandoned by someone, but whether
friend or lover is unclear. ‘It makes no difference’ anyway, says
Kant, since these relationships share the same moral core of
communication, respect, and ‘sharing of heart’.21 In his Lectures on
Ethics, Kant's description of the reciprocity of sexual love has the
very same features as his description of friendship, as Christine
Korsgaard points out—the same talk of surrender and retrieval. Of
friendship, Kant writes that if I love my friend ‘as I love myself’,
and he loves me ‘as he loves himself’, ‘he restores to me that with
(p.321) which I part and I come back to myself again’. Of sexual
love, Kant writes ‘if I yield myself completely to another and obtain
the person of the other in return, I win myself back’.22 If sexual
love and friendship are similar, as Kant suggests, then a lover can
be a
friend . . . in whom we can confide unreservedly, and to
whom we can disclose completely all our dispositions
and judgments, from whom we can and need hide
nothing, to whom we can communicate our whole self.23
There is reason for thinking that Kant is an optimist, who believes
that sexual love and friendship are alike in their power to provide
an escape from solipsism, through mutual knowledge, affection,
respect, and the trust which makes knowledge possible.
2.2. Interlude
The sense of discovery in love and friendship can be brought
to life by novelists in ways that no philosopher can hope to do,
and this section tells a story from The Innocent, by Ian
McEwan.
She sat across from him and they warmed their hands
round the big mugs. He knew from experience that
unless he made a formidable effort, a pattern was
waiting to impose itself: a polite enquiry would elicit a
polite response and another question. Have you lived
Page 11 of 55
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: UC - Berkeley
Library; date: 10 December 2018
Sexual Solipsism
here long? Do you travel far to work? . . . Only silences
would interrupt the relentless tread of question and
answer. They would be calling to each other over
immense distances, from adjacent mountain peaks . . .
Rather than tolerate more silence, he settled after all for
more small talk and began to ask, ‘Have you lived here
long?’
But all in a rush she spoke over him, saying, ‘How do you
look without your glasses? Show me please.’ This last
word she elongated beyond what any native speaker
would have considered reasonable, unfurling a delicate
papery thrill through Leonard's stomach. He snatched
the glasses from his face and blinked at her. He could
see quite well up to three feet, and her features had only
partially dissolved. ‘And so,’ she said quietly. ‘It is how I
thought. Your eyes are beautiful and all the time they are
hidden. Has no one told you how they are beautiful?’ . . .
His voice sounded strangled in his ears. ‘No, no one has
said that’ . . .
‘Then I am the first to discover you?’ There was humour,
but no mockery, in her look. She interlocked her fingers
with his . . .. Their hands fitted well, the grip was
intricate, unbreakable, there were so many points of
contact. In this poor (p.322) light, and without his
glasses, he could not see which fingers were his own.
Sitting in the darkening, chilly room in his raincoat,
holding on to her hand, he felt he was throwing away his
life. The abandonment was delicious. . . . Something was
pouring out of him, through his palm and into hers,
something was spreading back up his arm, across his
chest, constricting his throat. His only thought was a
repetition: So this is it, it's like this, so this is it . . .24
Leonard knows from experience how the encounter will proceed.
They will be remote as adjacent mountain peaks, a vast space of
awkward good manners and English reserve floating between
them, despite his best hopes. He doesn't know at all, of course. He
hadn't begun to factor into the equation what Maria herself might
think, or want, or do.
Page 12 of 55
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: UC - Berkeley
Library; date: 10 December 2018
Sexual Solipsism
He began to explain himself . . . ‘Actually, I didn't know
whether you'd want to see me, or if you'd even recognise
me’.
‘Do you have another friend in Berlin?’
‘Oh no, nothing like that’ . . .
‘And did you have any girlfriends in England?’
‘Not many, no.’
‘How many?’
He hesitated before making a lunge at the truth. ‘Well,
actually, none.’
‘You've never had one?’
‘No.’ Maria leaned forwards. ‘You mean, you've never . . .
’
He could not bear to hear whatever term she was about
to use. ‘No, I never have.’
She put her hand to her mouth to stifle a yelp of
laughter. It was not so extraordinary a thing in nineteen
fifty five for a man of Leonard's background and
temperament to have had no sexual experience by the
end of his twenty‐fifth year. But it was a remarkable
thing for a man to confess. He regretted it immediately.
She had the laughter under control, but now she was
blushing. It was the interlocking fingers that had made
him think he could get away with speaking without
pretence. In this bare little room with its pile of assorted
shoes belonging to a woman who lived alone and did not
fuss with milk jugs or doilies on tea trays, it should have
been possible to deal in unadorned truths.
Page 13 of 55
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: UC - Berkeley
Library; date: 10 December 2018
Sexual Solipsism
Maria's directness, her evident delight in him, her indifference to
feminine niceties, her physical closeness, make him trust her.
Leonard has a feeling (p.323) of throwing away his life in a
‘delicious abandonment’, the surrender Kant described which is
perhaps more typical of lovers than friends. He has the impulse of
which Kant wrote, the desire love has to ‘communicate itself
completely’, that ‘expects of its respondent a similar sharing of
heart, unweakened by distrustful reticence.’ But the relations of
lovers are at once more intimate and more convention‐governed
than the relations of friends. And it is not at all obvious that a lover
can always be a ‘friend . . . in whom we can confide unreservedly,
and . . . from whom we can and need hide nothing’, especially at
first. Margaret Atwood once asked a group of men, what is it that
you fear most from women? The reply was, we're afraid that they'll
laugh at us.25 There was no mockery at first, but Maria is surely
laughing at him now.
The story continues:
. . . it should have been possible to deal in unadorned
truths.
And in fact, it was. Maria's blushes were brought on by
shame at the laughter she knew Leonard would
misunderstand. For hers was the laughter of nervous
relief. She had been suddenly absolved from the
pressures and rituals of seduction. She would not have to
adopt a conventional role and be judged in it, and she
would not be measured against other women. Her fear of
being physically abused had receded. She would not be
obliged to do anything she did not want. She was free,
they both were free, to invent their own terms. They
could be partners in invention. And she really had
discovered for herself this shy Englishman with the
steady gaze and the long lashes, she had him first, she
would have him all to herself. These thoughts she
formulated later in solitude. At the time they erupted in
the single hoot of relief and hilarity which she had
suppressed to a yelp.
Leonard took a long pull of his tea, set down the mug
and said ‘Ah’ in a hearty, unconvincing way. He put his
glasses on and stood up.
Page 14 of 55
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: UC - Berkeley
Library; date: 10 December 2018
Sexual Solipsism
Maria's laughter, if only he could read it, spells joyful relief: a relief
at a release from convention, and something else—a relief that
accompanies the vanishing of fear. The story about Margaret
Atwood had another chapter. She asked the women, what is it that
you most fear from men? The reply was, we're afraid that they'll kill
us. Maria has known violent soldiers and (p.324) an abusive
husband, after which the innocence of Leonard is a treasure. But
innocence is partly ignorance, and Leonard takes the laughter to be
his worst fear fulfilled. Convinced of his ‘humiliating tactical
blunder’, Leonard invents an excuse and turns to leave.
He was fumbling with the unfamiliar lock and Maria was
right at his back. . . . The man scrabbling to leave by her
front door was less like the men she had known and
more like herself. She knew just how it felt. When you
felt sorry for yourself, you wanted to make things
worse . . ..
He opened the door at last and turned to say his
goodbyes. Did he really believe that she was fooled by
his politeness and the invented appointment, or that his
desperation was invisible? He was telling her he was
sorry he had to dash off, and expressing gratitude for the
tea again, and offering his hand—a handshake!—when
she reached up and lifted his glasses clear of his face
and strode back into her sitting room with them . . ..
‘Look here,’ he said, and, letting the door close behind
him, took one step then another into the apartment. And
that was it, he was back in. He had wanted to stay, now
he had to. ‘I really do have to be going.’ He stood in the
centre of the tiny room, irresolute, still attempting to
fake his hesitant English form of outrage.
She stood close so he could see her clearly. How
wonderful it was, not to be frightened of a man. It gave
her a chance to like him, to have desires which were not
simply reactions to his. She took his hands in hers. ‘But I
haven't finished looking at your eyes.’ Then, with the
Berlin girl's forthrightness . . . she added, ‘Du Dummer!
Wenn es für dich das erste Mal ist, bin ich sehr glücklich.
When this is your first time, then I am a very lucky girl.’
It was her ‘this’ which held Leonard. He was back with
‘this’. What they were doing here was all part of ‘this’,
his first time.
Page 15 of 55
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: UC - Berkeley
Library; date: 10 December 2018
Sexual Solipsism
Leonard's revelation is not after all a tactical error. His innocence,
his ignorance about tactics and conventions, his awkwardness—all
are utterly endearing to Maria. Without the trammels of convention
and fear, there is room for discovery. She can know how he feels,
she knows herself how stubborn self‐pity can be, that when you feel
sorry for yourself, you want to make things worse. There is room
for ordinary friendship: she has a chance to like him. There is room
for desire: a chance for her to have desires which are not simply
reactions to his. The two of them are free to be lovers who are
partners in invention, which is what they indeed become.
(p.325) 3. The Solipsism of Treating People as Things
The optimism about friendship and sexual love occasionally to
be found in some of Kant's writings must be placed against a
pessimism which is his more common attitude.
3.1. Kant on Sexual Objectification
Kant more often writes as though sexual love does not provide
an escape from solipsism at all. Sexual desire, he says in the
passage partly quoted above,
. . . is an appetite for another human being . . .. Human
love is good will, affection, promoting the happiness of
others and finding joy in their happiness. But it is clear
that when a person loves another purely from sexual
desire, none of these factors enter into love. Far from
there being any concern for the happiness of the loved
one, the lover, in order to satisfy his desire, may even
plunge the loved one into the depths of misery. Sexual
love makes of the loved person an object of appetite; as
soon as that appetite has been stilled, the person is cast
aside as one casts away a lemon that has been sucked
dry.26
Sexual love is not a species of ‘human love’ but is opposed to it: or
so Kant seems to say here. Sexual love is not the cure for solipsism,
but the disease. Sexual desire makes of the loved person an ‘object
of appetite’. What does he mean?
Clearly there is one, innocuous, sense in which sexual desire
makes of the loved person ‘an object’. Any intentional attitude
directed towards a person makes of that person an ‘object’ of
that attitude: an intentional object. A person can be an object
of someone's thought, or love, or loathing, or respect, or
desire. This sense of ‘object’ yields no grounds for moral
alarm. On the contrary, we have duties to make persons into
objects, in some of these ways. We have duties to make
persons into objects of knowledge, and love, and (p.326)
Page 16 of 55
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: UC - Berkeley
Library; date: 10 December 2018
Sexual Solipsism
respect. These ways of making persons into objects are
implied by the duty we have to escape solipsism. So while it
may well be that sexual desire makes a person into an object
in this intentional sense, since the same can be said of the
intentional attitudes of knowledge, and love, and respect, we
have no explanation yet for Kant's moral dismay. Kant must
mean something more by the claim that sexual love makes of a
person ‘an object of appetite’, and two different suggestions
have made, by Korsgaard, and by Herman.
According to Korsgaard, Kant believes that sexual desire takes
as its intentional object not a mere body, but a person in his or
her entirety. Kant says,
Amongst our inclinations there is one which is directed
towards other human beings. They themselves, and not
their work and services, are its objects of enjoyment. . . .
There is an inclination which we may call an appetite for
enjoying another human being. We refer to sexual
impulse. Man can, of course, use another human being
as an instrument for his service; he can use his hands,
his feet, and even all his powers; he can use him for his
own purposes with the other's consent. But there is no
way in which a human being can be made an object of
indulgence for another except through sexual
impulse . . . it is an appetite for another human being.27
Kant says here that the sexual inclination is ‘directed towards other
human beings’: that ‘they themselves’, and not their services, or
their bodies, are its objects of enjoyment. Korsgaard says that what
troubles Kant is the idea that sexual love demands that the beloved
put not simply her body but her entire self at the lover's disposal.
‘Viewed through the eyes of sexual desire another person is seen as
something wantable, desirable, and therefore inevitably
possessable. To yield to that desire, to the extent it is really that
desire you yield to, is to allow yourself to be possessed’.
Herman suggests an alternative interpretation. She draws
attention to the evident common ground between Kant and the
feminist writers who say that sexual relations can make
women into objects: that sexual relations can objectify women.
On this interpretation, Kant thinks that there is something
about sexual desire that can cast the desired person in the role
of a thing, a mere body, something whose value is merely
instrumental. Kant says,
Page 17 of 55
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: UC - Berkeley
Library; date: 10 December 2018
Sexual Solipsism
Because sexuality is not an inclination which one human
being has for another as such, but is an inclination for
the sex of the other, it is a principle of the degradation of
human nature . . . That [the woman] is a human being is
of no (p.327) concern to the man; only her sex is the
object of his desires. Human nature is thus subordinated.
Hence it comes that all men and women do their best to
make not their human nature but their sex more alluring
and direct their activities and lusts entirely towards sex.
Human nature is thereby sacrificed to sex.28
Kant's claim that in sexual love a person is somehow made thing‐
like finds an echo in claims of MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin, and
Herman offers the reader some samples from the latter, for
comparison:
It is especially in the acceptance of the object status that
her humanity is hurt; it is a metaphysical acceptance of
lower status in sex and in society; an implicit acceptance
of less freedom, less privacy, less integrity . . . a political
collaboration with his dominance . . . [In intercourse] he
confirms for himself and for her what she is; that she is
something, not someone; certainly not someone equal.29
Sexual desire makes a woman ‘something, not someone’. On
Herman's interpretation of Kant, sexual desire takes as its
intentional object a body, rather than a person. It may view the
body as an object of beauty, or it may view the body as an
anonymous instrument, but in either case, it ignores the person
who is partly constituted by her body.
On Herman's interpretation, sexual love can be reductive: it
can make of the loved person an object by making her
something, not someone. On Korsgaard's interpretation,
sexual desire can be invasive: it can make of the loved person
an object by viewing her as someone (not something), a person
in her entirety (not merely a body)—but a person to be invaded
and possessed.
Neither description is plausible, as a description of the
essential and inevitable character of sexual relationships, even
according to Kant: for Kant says that sexual love can be like
friendship in its power to unlock the prison of the self, nourish
the epistemic and moral virtues, provide escape from the hell
of solipsism. However, both interpretations are evidently
plausible as descriptions of different pathologies of sexual
love. Perhaps sexual desire can indeed be invasive, in the way
that Korsgaard describes. That possibility is addressed in this
Page 18 of 55
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: UC - Berkeley
Library; date: 10 December 2018
Sexual Solipsism
essay's companion piece.30 Perhaps sexual desire can indeed
be reductive, in the way that Herman describes. To consider
this possibility is to consider in closer detail the (p.328)
solipsism of treating people as things, the solipsism of making
someone an object.
Page 19 of 55
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: UC - Berkeley
Library; date: 10 December 2018
Sexual Solipsism
3.2. Making Someone an ‘object’
The notion of an object draws its weight from a particular
picture of the world and the place of human beings in it, a
picture which has been in the background of the discussion so
far, and which, as I have painted it, is broadly Kantian. There
is the world of natural phenomena—things bright and
beautiful, creatures great and small, purple mountains, rivers
running by, sunset, morning, bright sky. Things dance
inexorably to a score laid down by the laws of nature. Their
movements are explained and predicted by scientists and
engineers, cooks and gardeners. Things appear to our senses,
they dazzle and bewitch with color and noise and smell. Things
provide us with tools. We take them, fix them up, make them
more amenable to our purposes, and use them for whatever
we want without so much as a by your leave. Things don't talk
back, argue, communicate. Things may be noisy, but when it
comes to speech, things are silent. Things are bought and sold
in the marketplace. They have a price fixed by their usefulness
to a buyer. When things are worn out, you throw them away. If
you lose a thing, you can always replace it with another thing
that will do the job just as well.
Despite the fact that people are to be counted amongst the
creatures great and small, our attitude to people is not the
same. And although people are undubitably part of the great
dance whose score is laid down by laws of nature, people—
somehow—get to make up their own steps. People are viewed
as responsible for what they do. We feel resentful when they
hurt us deliberately, grateful when they help us deliberately,
and in general have a range of reactive attitudes that show
that we are, as Strawson says, involved.31 The movements of
human beings are to be explained, not by a physicist, but by
someone who understands the pattern of beliefs, desires,
reasons, and decisions, that motivate the human beings.
People talk back, argue, communicate. People appear to our
senses, just as other sensory phenomena do, and a person can
be more dazzling and bewitching than any rainbow. But there
is always more to a person than meets the eye or (p.329) ear,
there is an inner life, a garden enclosed, which may be very
different to the appearance presented at the gate. With a
person there is a potential gap between appearance and
reality that makes room for shyness, reticence, hypocrisy, and
deception, one reason why the problem of other minds is not
simply the problem of the external world. A person who is an
Page 20 of 55
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: UC - Berkeley
Library; date: 10 December 2018
Sexual Solipsism
object of appearance for me is someone for whom I in turn am
an object of appearance. And on the Kantian vision, what most
sets human beings apart from the world of natural phenomena
is their capacity for choice, a capacity which endows each
person with ‘an inalienable dignity’, and prohibits the treating
of persons as things.
To be an object, on this picture, is to be a natural
phenomenon: something which is not free, something whose
movements could be explained and predicted by science,
something whose movements are not determined by reason
and choice. It is to be something incapable of the activities of
knowledge, communication, love, respect. It is to be something
that is merely a sensory appearance, something whose
qualities are exhausted by how it can look, feel, sound, and
taste to a perceiver. It is to be merely a body, something solid
and extended in space. It is to be a tool, something whose
value is merely instrumental, something which is a potential
possession. These different aspects of the notion of an object
are related: it is no coincidence that the realm of determined
things, the realm of sensory appearances, the realm of bodies,
and the realm of potential tools and possessions are, for Kant
at least, one and the same. But these are all conceptually, and
modally, distinct. And since they are distinct, a person may be
made an object in some of these ways, but not others. That is
why the solipsism of treating people as things can be a
piecemeal, partial affair.
3.3. ‘Making’ Someone an Object
What sense can be attached to the idea that someone whose
humanity is inalienable can nonetheless be made an object in
some or all of the above ways? This is a vast topic, but here I
want to describe four overlapping ways of object‐making.32
(p.330) Objective Attitudes
One might make someone an object, in one sense, when one
takes an objective attitude towards her, in the manner that
Strawson described in ‘Freedom and Resentment’. This is to
view someone as if she were a natural phenomenon in the first
sense—lacking in responsibility, not (or not fully) free,
autonomous, or responsible for what she does.
Page 21 of 55
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: UC - Berkeley
Library; date: 10 December 2018
Sexual Solipsism
To adopt the objective attitude to another human being is
to see him, perhaps, as an object of social policy; as a
subject for what, in a wide range of sense, might be
called treatment; as something . . . to be managed or
handled or cured or trained.33
Strawson says that the objective stance can be contrasted with the
stance of the engaged participant, and an important sign of the
difference between them is the absence or presence of certain
reactive attitudes. In general, the absence of such reactive
attitudes as resentment indicates the presence of an objective
attitude. One does not resent the (hurtful) behavior of a human
being who is not held to be responsible.
It that always so? It is plausible enough for the cases Strawson
considers: the benign social scientist, the teacher, the
psychiatrist, who can afford the distance required by the
objective attitude. But there are exceptions to Strawson's rule.
Consider cases where one is in a relation of on‐going
dependence on, or vulnerability to, a person who is not
responsible for the pain they cause, and is known not to be
responsible. One views them as not responsible, and in that
sense takes an objective attitude towards them: however, one
may still feel resentment even though the hurtful actions are
not viewed as the result of reasoned choice. One might resent
a person who innocently, and deafeningly, snores. One might
resent a cruel jailer, even if the cruelty were viewed as a result
of Maoist indoctrination. One might resent an infant who
guiltlessly, and inexplicably, screamed for months on end. The
resentment here is not always dissipated by knowledge that
the person is not responsible. Such knowledge can even,
rightly or wrongly, exacerbate the resentment. Where the
vulnerability is towards a loved person who was once
responsible, but is no longer, resentment can come from a
feeling that one has been robbed, a feeling that something
precious has been torn away. What can provoke resentment is
the very fact that the loved one is no longer a participant. One
can feel not only grief but anger towards a loved person who
has become senile, or insane, or (p.331) alcoholic. And the
death of a loved person can provoke a potent mixture of grief
and rage. How dare she die! How dare she leave me! Such
resentment is a datum of human experience, and rational or
not, it seems relevant to a Strawsonian task of a purely
descriptive metaphysics.
Page 22 of 55
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: UC - Berkeley
Library; date: 10 December 2018
Sexual Solipsism
To take an objective attitude towards someone is one way of
treating a person as a thing: but the objective attitude
described by Strawson is rather benevolent, notwithstanding
its lack of respect. It is the attitude of the impartial social
scientist, the kind teacher, the concerned psychiatrist. What
has this attitude to do with the treating of women as things?
Something, certainly. But it is unlikely that this is what Kant
and feminist writers have in mind when they say that sexual
desire can make a person an object. They do not mean that in
sexual contexts one person looks upon another with an eye of
benign and dispassionate concern, viewing the person as not
responsible for their behavior and thus ‘an object of social
policy’. There is something else.
Objectifying Attitudes
Someone might display, not the objective attitude which
Strawson described, but what we can call an objectifying
attitude. Someone might view a person as thing‐like: view her
not merely as lacking in responsibility, but view her as if there
were nothing more to her than an appearance, nothing more
to her than how she looks, and generally manifests herself to
the senses. Someone might view a person as being nothing
more than a body, nothing more than a conveniently packaged
bundle of eyes, lips, face, breasts, buttocks, legs. Someone
might view a person as if she were a mere tool, a mere
instrument to serve his own purposes, or property that
belonged to him. The benign social scientist imagined by
Strawson would not view a person in these ways. But these
latter ways come closer to the sexual solipsism described by
Kant, MacKinnon, and Dworkin. An objectifying attitude may
well have in common with the objective attitude a lack of
respect, and a tendency to view a person as not fully
responsible, but other aspects of the notion of an object may
be in play: mere sensory appearance, mere body, possession,
tool. One who takes an objective attitude sees a person in
terms of certain well‐meaning relational gerundives: he sees
him as to be handled, to be managed, to be cured, to be
trained. One who takes the objectifying attitude sees a person
in terms of different relational gerundives: something to be
looked at, to be pursued, to be consumed, to be used, to be
possessed.
Page 23 of 55
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: UC - Berkeley
Library; date: 10 December 2018
Sexual Solipsism
(p.332) I remarked that, contrary to Strawson, it seems
possible to resent someone while at the same time ‘seeing’
them as an object, in his sense, that is, as lacking in
responsibility—resentment seems compatible with the
objective attitude. It is worth noting that resentment seems
compatible with an objectifying attitude as well. Someone who
views women reductively, as brutish creatures whose purpose
is the satisfaction of men's lusts, may also manifest resentment
towards women. Misogyny may sometimes present just this
combination. And perhaps the connection between the
resentment and the objectifying attitude is not coincidental.
Perhaps it is caused by a horror that one's desires put one in
the power of such contemptible creatures.
There are objective and objectifying attitudes, but this
emphasis on attitudes as ways of ‘seeing’ a person may
suggest mere states of mind, not in themselves harmful to the
person who is ‘made an object’ in these attitudinal ways. As
Strawson says, though, it matters to us very much that we are
viewed as people, and not as things. Strawson says that in
much of our behavior, ‘the benefit or injury resides mainly or
entirely in the manifestation of attitude itself’.34 If one is
injured by being made the object of an objective attitude, one
can also be injured by being made the object of an objectifying
attitude, and a person is injured when she is viewed as if she
were a thing—unfree, mere appearance, body, tool, or
property. But there is more than ‘seeing’ involved.
Strawson somewhat blurs the distinctions between attitude,
action, and effect in his use of the gerundives: one adopts the
objective attitude when one ‘sees’ a person as ‘an object of
social policy . . . as something . . . to be managed or handled or
cured or trained’. Is it a matter of seeing, or doing? Clearly,
both. The person who sees someone as to‐be‐managed, to‐be‐
cured, to‐be‐trained, will translate that attitude into action,
and will (assuming power and resources) actually manage,
cure, or train. He will act in a certain way. And he will achieve
certain effects. The objectifying attitude likewise will involve
both seeing and doing. MacKinnon says, ‘Men treat women as
who they see women as being’. Objectification is a stance, a
way of looking at the world, and a social practice.35 Someone
(p.333) who adopts an objectifying attitude may do things to
the people he views as objects. He may turn people into
objects, in so far as that is possible. If human beings have an
‘inalienable’ dignity, as Kant says, then there will be limits on
Page 24 of 55
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: UC - Berkeley
Library; date: 10 December 2018
Sexual Solipsism
how far this process can go: one cannot turn a human being
into something that is entirely unfree, a mere tool, something
that is exhausted by its sensory appearance, its body. But a
person can be made less free, more tool‐like, and a person's
appearance and bodily qualities can be made to play a more
exaggerated role in her own social identity.
When MacKinnon says that ‘men treat women as who they see
women as being’, she means, in part, that men see women as
beings whose purpose is the satisfaction of desire. Perhaps
men see women as being submissive by nature; they want
women to be that way; and they treat women accordingly. And
in conditions of gender hierarchy, seeing can become doing.
Men attribute certain qualities to women, see women a certain
way, and that projection of qualities ‘is not just an illusion or a
fantasy or a mistake. It becomes embodied because it is
enforced’.36
Sally Haslanger has drawn upon this theme in MacKinnon to
offer one conception of what it is to objectify someone. To
objectify someone is to take a (practical) attitude that has four
dimensions: it is to view and treat someone as an (intentional)
object for the satisfaction of one's desire; to force her to have
a property that one desires her to have; to believe that she has
that property; and to believe that she has that property by
nature.37 It is worth noting that of these four conditions, the
first, second and fourth would each independently appear
among the objectifying attitudes described by Kant. To view
someone as an object for the satisfaction of desire is to treat
her as a thing: ‘as soon as a person becomes an object of
appetite for another, all motives of moral relationship cease to
function, because as an object of appetite for another, a person
becomes a thing’.38 To force someone to have some property is
to violate her autonomy, and in that sense to treat her as a
thing. To believe that someone has some property by nature is
to view her as determined, lacking in responsibility, part of the
natural order, and this too would be to treat her as a thing. On
Haslanger's conception (p.334) of objectification, the
objectifying attitude requires the satisfying of all four
conditions. On this conception, men objectify women if, for
example, they view and treat women as objects of sexual
desire, desire them to be submissive, force them to submit,
believe that women are in fact submissive, and believe that
they are submissive by nature. The ‘seeing’ involved is partly
accurate, and partly inaccurate. The attribution of qualities is
Page 25 of 55
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: UC - Berkeley
Library; date: 10 December 2018
Sexual Solipsism
‘not just an illusion or a fantasy or a mistake’, as MacKinnon
says: women do indeed have the qualities in question, because
they are forced to have them. There is an accurate descriptive
belief, combined with an illusory projective belief. The illusion
is to think women have the enforced qualities by nature.
Haslanger's analysis offers us one way to understand Kant's
moral dismay about the character of (some) sexual desire. It
may be that sexual desire can sometimes ‘make a person an
object’ by instantiating the four‐fold attitudes of
objectification: viewing a woman as an object of sexual desire,
desiring her to be submissive, believing that she is submissive,
and believing that she is submissive by nature. This would be
to make the desired person into a mere instrument to serve
one's own purposes, a mere means to satisfy one's own
pleasure, something less free, and more like a thing, whose
behavior is dictated by the will of another.
Page 26 of 55
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: UC - Berkeley
Library; date: 10 December 2018
Sexual Solipsism
Self‐Objectification
It is possible for someone to make herself an object, and this is
a central theme of de Beauvoir's analysis of the subjection of
women, and of many who speak of women's complicity in
oppression. Perhaps someone could make herself an object in
any of the ways that we have described. Perhaps someone
could take an objective attitude to herself by viewing herself
as unfree, as having no choice. Perhaps someone could take,
not only the objective, but the objectifying attitude towards
herself: view herself as being nothing more than how she
appears to someone else, nothing more than her body, nothing
more than a thing whose (relevant) properties are bodily and
sensory, shape, weight, textures, and looks.39 She may view
herself as determined, as having the qualities she has by
nature. She may take herself to have value only in so far as
she can be used, or possessed, by someone else. She may view
herself as a being whose purpose is to satisfy the desire of
another. The self‐objectifying attitude will be a (p.335)
matter of both seeing, and doing. Someone who has it may
actually turn herself into an object—so far as that is possible.
She may bring it about that she is in fact less free, more tool‐
like, more thing‐like. She may become passive, she may
become submissive, she may become a slave.
To view oneself in these ways is to be in bad faith, according to
existentialists, and they say that it presents a constant
temptation to us all. Each of us would like ‘to forgo liberty and
become a thing’.40 We would each prefer the role of the
automaton, in the hat and coat, to the role of the free and
conscious agent, the Cartesian ego, the meditator doing battle
with his goliath. When Herman says that Kant and feminist
writers share a common ground, she has partly this self‐
objectification in mind. Andrea Dworkin says that a woman's
humanity is hurt by her own ‘acceptance of the object status’.
She says that sexual desire is implicated in a woman's making
an object of herself. Kant is likewise concerned about what a
person does to himself or herself: he is concerned that ‘men
and women do their best to make not their human nature but
their sex more alluring,’ and that ‘human nature is thereby
sacrificed to sex’. Kant wastes no sympathy on the person who
objectifies himself or herself. ‘One who makes himself a
worm’, he says, ‘cannot complain if others step on him’. Such a
person violates a self‐regarding duty, the duty of self‐esteem,
and is guilty of servility. Such a person fails to show respect
Page 27 of 55
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: UC - Berkeley
Library; date: 10 December 2018
Sexual Solipsism
for the humanity in one's own person, by virtue of which ‘we
are not for sale at any price, and possess an inalienable
dignity’.41 Kant's words about servility are harsh, but they find
a later echo in the fine line de Beauvoir attempts to draw
between bad faith and oppression: the downfall to thing‐hood
‘represents a moral fault if the subject consents to it; if it is
inflicted . . . it spells frustration and oppression’.42
It is oppression ‘if it is inflicted’. One way to do something is to
make someone else do it. One way to hurt someone is to get
someone else to hurt them. One way to hurt someone is to get
them to hurt themselves. (The death of Socrates was an
execution and a suicide.) One way to make someone an object
is to make her make herself an object. This misuse of a person
would go beyond the usual vices, in Kantian terms. When you
lie to someone, you fail to respect their humanity, and you
prevent them from being the authors of their actions. When
you steal from someone, (p.336) the same is true. However,
while the liar and the thief do treat a person as a mere
instrument, they do not desire the person in question to
identify herself as a mere instrument. They do not desire the
person to throw off her personhood with abject abandonment.
But perhaps that is what sexual desire can sometimes demand.
When Andrea Dworkin says that a woman's humanity is hurt
by her own ‘acceptance of the object status’, she takes this
acceptance to be demanded by a man's desire. Dworkin
(famously) sees this as a feature of ‘normal’ sexual
intercourse, but what seems clear is that sexual desire in its
sadistic guise at any rate can have the character she
describes.
Sadistic Attitudes
I take my description of sadistic sexual desire from the work of
a well‐known contemporary analytic philosopher (let him be
temporarily nameless) who attempts in a lengthy book to
analyze the complex terrain of sexual desire. Sadistic desire,
he says, is a desire to ‘vanquish the other in his body, to force
him to abjure himself for his body's sake’; it aims ‘to show the
ease with which another's perspective can be invaded and
enslaved by pain, to humiliate the other by compelling the self
to identify with what is not‐self’, to ‘go under’ in the stream of
bodily suffering. It aims, through the infliction of pain, ‘to
overcome the other in the act of physical contact’. The author
Page 28 of 55
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: UC - Berkeley
Library; date: 10 December 2018
Sexual Solipsism
approvingly quotes Sartre as an accurate reporter on the
attitude of the sadist.
The spectacle which is offered to the sadist is that of a
freedom which struggles against the expanding of the
flesh, and which freely chooses to be submerged in the
flesh. At the moment of abjuration, the result sought is
attained: the body is wholly flesh, panting and obscene;
it holds the position which the torturers have given to it,
not that which it would have assumed by itself; the cords
which bind it hold it as an inert thing, and thereby it has
ceased to be the object which moves spontaneously. In
the abjuration a freedom chooses to be wholly identified
with this body; this distorted and heaving body is the
very image of a broken and enslaved freedom.43
In Sartre's description, the ‘result sought’ by sadistic desire is that
the person will turn herself into a thing, ‘abjure’ herself, become
‘wholly identified’ with a ‘broken and enslaved freedom’. Sadistic
desire aims that the desired person should make herself as thing‐
like as it is possible for a person to be. Sartre's ‘incomparable
description’ in fact applies to the attitudes of (p.337) torturer and
sadist alike, according to our author. The torturer and the sadist
both aim to be seen by their victims in a dominating light, both aim
to inflict pain. But what distinguishes the two is that the sexual
sadist (unlike the mere torturer) has in addition a desire for the
victim to have a certain desire: he ‘wants the other [person] to
want the pain inflicted, and to be aroused by it’. He wants the other
person to desire the pain and domination, and to be aroused by it.
He wants the other to want to submit, he wants the other to want
to abjure herself. The attitude has some aspects of solipsism, and
not others. In so far as it is a desire for the other person to be
identified as a thing, it is solipsistic. In so far as it is a desire for the
other person to have a certain desire, it demands that the other
should retain some human qualities. But the desired desire is a
desire to be a thing, a desire to become the ‘very image of a broken
and enslaved freedom’. The sadist is a solipsist who wants the other
to want to be a machine. He is a solipsist who demands that the
other choose to be a mere machine, that she choose to become a
thing that cannot choose. The project, as Sartre says, is doomed. If
she wants and chooses anything, she is no machine.
One hopes that the words used by our author—vanquish,
force, abjure, invade, enslave, humiliate, suffer, overcome—
describe some rare variety of violent rape, punishable by law.
But no: the author distinguishes this ‘normal’ attitude from a
‘perverted’ sadism which cares nothing about the desires of its
victim, but seeks rather to ‘abolish the personal object of
Page 29 of 55
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: UC - Berkeley
Library; date: 10 December 2018
Sexual Solipsism
desire . . . and replace him with a compliant dummy’. The
‘ideas of dominance and submission’ manifested in the
‘normal’ sadism ‘form a fundamental part of the ordinary
understanding of the sexual performance’. Sadism is, he says,
a ‘normal’ variant of this ‘ordinary understanding’ of sexual
performance. It is part of a ‘common human condition’.
The author tries to offer a gender‐neutral story about the
phenomenon of ‘normal’ sadism, and presents a man, Count
Sacher Masoch, as chief among masochists. But it is hard to
credit this attempt at neutrality, given the kind of sexual
encounter that the author offers as a paradigm. He takes
seriously the hypothesis that sadism ‘lies in the very structure
of the sexual urge’. Whose ‘sexual urge’? He cites expert
social science testimony according to which
the paradigm example is the practice of ‘marriage by
capture’—in which a woman is pursued by her suitors
and forced to yield by the strongest . . . The girl . . .
submits (p.338) only to that force which she also
desires. The aggression of the male, and the submission
of the female, here combine to fulfil an archetype of
sexual encounter.
The games of an aristocrat, and the forcible rape of a woman, are
presented by the author as expressions of the same unitary sexual
phenomenon. In both, a desire to dominate, and be dominated, are
desires that lie ‘in the very structure of the sexual urge’. The
paradigm case he offers shows how this is to be understood. It is
the submission of the female to force that is supposed to provide
the ‘archetype’ of sexual encounter.
These descriptions of the ‘ordinary understanding of the
sexual performance’ and its ‘normal’ variant might have been
lifted from the works of MacKinnon and Dworkin. The author
seems to share their bleak view about the paradigm sexual
encounter: that the sexual desire of a man is a desire to
dominate another person, a desire to overcome her, a desire to
make her abjure her personhood; that it is, for women, a
desire to submit to force. Indeed, the view of this author is
bleaker than that feminist view, since he appears to see the
‘ideas’ of dominance and submission not as a contingent
product of oppressive but changeable social relations, but as
arising from the very structure of sexual desire.
Page 30 of 55
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: UC - Berkeley
Library; date: 10 December 2018
Sexual Solipsism
The philosopher is Roger Scruton.44 It is interesting to learn of
such unanimity between radical feminists and a conservative
philosopher. It is true that assertions of common ground
between some feminists and conservatives are not unusual:
there are critics who complain of an allied opposition to
pornography, for example. But this particular unanimity seems
new. Here there is an agreement, not about the ‘immorality’ of
pornography, but about the normality of domination.
MacKinnon, and Dworkin, and Scruton, agree that domination
is ‘normal’, that it is the dynamic which underlies ordinary
sexual relations. If this opinion were right, then Kant would be
right to be concerned about the morality of sexual desire. Kant
would be right if he thought that ‘normal’ sexual desire aims
to reduce people to things.
The appearance of unanimity is interesting, and perhaps
gratifying for any seeker of consensus—until, of course, one
realises that ‘normal’ is here being used by Scruton not in its
descriptive but its normative sense. Scruton (p.339) says that
the ideas of dominance and submission so fundamental to our
ordinary understanding of sexuality are ‘moral ideas’. He says
that sadistic desires ‘can easily be accounted for, in terms of
the conscious structure of desire, as an interpersonal emotion’,
and that they aim at ‘an intelligible moral relation’.45 The
‘marriage by capture’, and the games of the count, instantiate
‘an intelligible moral relation between effective equals’.46 The
contrast drawn between ‘normal’ sadism, and the ‘perverted’
variety which seeks a ‘compliant dummy’, is not a contrast
between the common and the exotic, but a contrast between
the morally appropriate, and the morally inappropriate. Well,
well. The most facile ascent from fact to value is the ascent
from the normal to the normatively appropriate, and Scruton
would hardly be the first to infer the rightness of an activity
from its ordinariness. However, our author is usually rather
more fussy about this kind of normative ascent, and his
standards for sexual ‘normality’ are hardly generous. A
homosexual, a masturbator, a woman who (heaven forbid)
touches her clitoris while having sex with her partner—none of
these people are, in his view, ‘normal’—their ordinariness
notwithstanding. They, unlike the sadist, are perverts, and
their actions are cowardly and obscene.47
Page 31 of 55
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: UC - Berkeley
Library; date: 10 December 2018
Sexual Solipsism
Scruton is right to describe the emotion of the sadist as a kind
of interpersonal relation: if a woman were a mere puppet, or
doll, or dummy to start with, there would be nothing to
‘vanquish’. If by describing a relation as ‘moral’ he were to
mean that it falls within the scope of morality, then it is a
‘moral relation’—as indeed are all relations of objectification.
That would hardly be grounds to approve them. The sadism
Scruton describes begins with an acknowledgement of the
humanity of the desired person. Sartre's sadist acknowledges
the desired other as a person with a unique inner life, a
‘freedom’, a being that ‘chooses’, and ‘moves spontaneously’.
The desired person is not regarded as unfree or thing‐like to
begin with, as with other forms of reductive objectification, or
sadism of the ‘perverted’ variety. The person is regarded as
free and to‐be‐willingly‐enslaved. The desire distinctive of
normal sadism, the desire (p.340) that one's partner should
want the pain and domination, and be aroused by it—this
desire, according to Scruton, transforms the action entirely,
and raises it to new moral heights. This production of a
‘broken and enslaved freedom’ is not obscene. This new
dimension elevates the action from mere torture to a morally
intelligible interpersonal relation which is ‘an affirmation of
mutual respect’.48 The action of the sadist thereby becomes a
mere ‘extended version of the lovebite’.49 The solipsist who
wants the other to want to be a machine is a superior sort of
fellow, on a moral plane far above the solipsist who views the
other as a machine from the start.
Scruton adds that the strategy adopted by the sadist is a
reasonable solution to a serious practical problem that can
plague sexual relations: namely, the problem of
embarrassment. The infliction of pain enables a person to do
what he ‘would otherwise be too embarrassed to do: to
overcome the other in the act of physical contact’.50
Embarrassment. One person plans to ‘overcome’ another in an
‘act of physical contact’—and the problem is embarrassment.
One person contemplates turning another into something
bound, tortured, distorted, inert, heaving, broken, enslaved—
and the problem is embarrassment. Here we have the Atwood
story all over again: ‘we're afraid that they'll laugh at us’. That
was Leonard's response to Maria, in McEwan's story. It is also
a response of liberals to pornography. The real victim of
pornography law, according to Ronald Dworkin, is the ‘shy
pornographer’. Poor chap, will he, or will he not, be permitted
Page 32 of 55
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: UC - Berkeley
Library; date: 10 December 2018
Sexual Solipsism
a brown paper bag for his magazine?51 The real, and serious,
problem about pornography is embarrassment, and Scruton
shows the same touching sympathy for the ‘normal’ sadist.
What a helpful advice column a philosopher could run here.
Imagine.
‘Dear sir, I am attracted to someone. So I really would like to
overcome her in the act of physical contact. But I find the
prospect embarrassing. What can I do? Signed, Embarrassed.’
‘Dear Embarrassed: Yes, I understand your problem perfectly.
Here's what to do. Make her suffer. Bind her with (p.341)
cords, make her into a distorted and heaving body, make her
wholly flesh, panting and obscene, the very image of a broken
and enslaved freedom. And make her want it. You'll find that
will relieve your embarrassment, and put a stop to unseemly
mirth. With best wishes, from your friendly Agony Uncle.’
Appearances notwithstanding, Scruton is an earthling like the
rest of us. That means he comes from a small planet in which
sexual violence against women is rife, where many marriages
are violent, many women have their first sexual experiences
under conditions of force, many women are raped. He comes
from a planet where the ‘moral ideas’ of dominance and
submission are popular, even fashionable, where many
adolescents apparently believe it acceptable for a man to rape
a woman if he is sexually aroused by her, and where many
young men find faces of women displaying distress and pain to
be more sexually attractive than faces showing pleasure.52
Why not, if pain and domination are thought to be what a
woman wants, and human sexual relations find their paradigm
in a ritual where a woman ‘submits . . . to that force which she
also desires’? Recall that the story about Margaret Atwood had
another chapter. She asked the women: What is it that you
most fear from men? The reply was, ‘we're afraid that they'll
kill us’. Why not, if in the ‘archetype of sexual encounter’ a
woman is ‘pursued’ by a gang, captured, and ‘forced to yield’
to ‘the strongest’—forced to yield to ‘the aggression of the
male’? Social scientists and pornographers, psychiatrists and
judges, have often preached the gospel that men dominate and
women not only submit, but like it that way. It was only a
matter of time, perhaps, before a philosopher should join their
illustrious ranks.
Page 33 of 55
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: UC - Berkeley
Library; date: 10 December 2018
Sexual Solipsism
(p.342) I said that feminist writers Andrea Dworkin and
Catharine MacKinnon seem to share Scruton's opinion that
there is something ‘normal’ about the dynamic of dominance
and submission. Kant may share this opinion too, and it may
be what he means when he says that sexual desire makes of a
person an object: he may mean that it aims to reduce a person
to a thing, because it aims to dominate. There are crucial
differences. Kant and the feminist writers appear to share the
descriptive part of Scruton's story, but they reject the
normative part. Unlike Scruton, they both acknowledge the
moral bleakness of this story, and refuse to accept it as
inevitable. For Scruton the story is not bleak, but fine and
morally intelligible; it is not avoidable, but ‘lies in the very
structure of the sexual urge’. This deterministic fantasy
belongs on the dust heap with the mouldering fantasies of
original sin, which Kant would have detested with equal
vehemence. Despite Kant's occasional pessimism, human
beings have, he thinks, a ‘splendid disposition for good’,53 and
it would be an inhuman pessimism that failed to agree. As for
the normative part of Scruton's verdict, enough is enough.
Domination may be ‘normal’ in one sense. To say it is therefore
‘normal’ in the other would be to make a more than
philosophical mistake.
3.4. Interlude, Again
One might wonder what, if anything, these abstract
descriptions of object‐making have to do with the sexual love
which Kant regards as an escape from solipsism. One might
wonder what they have to do with the ordinary lovers
described so well by McEwan. Perhaps it is a foolish
philosopher who would rush in where even novelists might
fear to tread.
As a matter of fact McEwan paints sexual solipsism as
eloquently as he paints its escape.54 There is a new
development in the relationship between Leonard and Maria.
Page 34 of 55
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: UC - Berkeley
Library; date: 10 December 2018
Sexual Solipsism
It began . . . with a simple perception. He looked down at
Maria, whose eyes were closed, and remembered she
was a German. The word had not been entirely prised
loose of its associations after all . . . German. Enemy.
Mortal enemy. Defeated enemy. This last brought with it
a shocking thrill. He diverted himself momentarily . . ..
Then: she was the defeated, she was his by right, by
conquest, by right of unimaginable violence and heroism
and sacrifice . . .. He was powerful and magnificent . . ..
He was victorious and good and strong and free. In
recollection (p.343) these formulations embarrassed
him. . . . They were alien to his obliging and kindly
nature, they offended his sense of what was reasonable.
One only had to look at her to know there was nothing
defeated about Maria. She had been liberated by the
invasion of Europe, not crushed . . .
But next time round the thoughts returned. They were
irresistibly exciting . . . she was his by right of conquest
and then, there was nothing she could do about it. She
did not want to be making love to him, but she had no
choice. . . . She was struggling to escape. She was
thrashing beneath him, he thought he heard her call out
‘No!’ She was shaking her head from side to side, she
had her eyes closed against the inescapable reality . . .
she was his, there was nothing she could do, she would
never get away. And that was it, that was the end for
him, he was gone, finished . . .
Over the following days, his embarrassment faded. He
accepted the obvious truth that what happened in his
head could not be sensed by Maria, even though she was
only inches away. These thoughts were his alone, nothing
to do with her at all.
Eventually, a more dramatic fantasy took shape. It
recapitulated all the previous elements. Yes, she was
defeated, conquered, his by right, could not escape, and
now, he was a soldier, weary, battle‐marked and bloody,
but heroically rather than disablingly so. He had taken
this women and was forcing her. Half terrified, half in
awe, she dared not disobey.
Page 35 of 55
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: UC - Berkeley
Library; date: 10 December 2018
Sexual Solipsism
Leonard has a kindly nature. He knows there is nothing defeated
about Maria. Nevertheless he finds that a certain cluster of
thoughts makes him feel good and powerful and strong and free:
the thought that she is his by right; the thought that she is a
defeated enemy; the thought that she is half terrified; the thought
that she is obeying him from fear and awe; the thought that she
wants to get away and cannot; the thought he is raping her. This
cluster of thoughts could have been plagiarized from Scruton's
description of the archetypical conquest, and Leonard finds it
irresistably exciting.
There is something intensely solipsistic about this sexual
encounter. But what? The events take place in a private
theatre, the theatre of Leonard's mind: they happen ‘in his
head’, ‘his alone, nothing to do with her at all’. What makes
them possible is ‘the obvious truth’, the Cartesian truth, that
other minds are less accessible than one's own. Leonard is like
the man Kant describes, who ‘must shut himself up in himself’,
who must remain ‘completely alone with his thoughts as in a
prison’.55 The two might as (p.344) well be ‘on adjacent
mountain peaks’, as they were before they came to know each
other. But it is not quite true that the events have ‘nothing to
do with her’: the ‘she’ of his fantasy is, in some sense, Maria
herself. Her own actual actions, her movements, her speech,
are all interpreted (in make‐believe) as the actions,
movements, speech, of a woman being raped. If the Cartesian
meditator were to encounter a friend among the automata in
their hats and coats, he would hear friendly words as the
words of a demon. Leonard hears loving words as the words of
a woman in pain and terror. And not just any woman, but
Maria herself (or Maria in so far as she is female and German
—not perhaps the same at all). Is Leonard treating her as
thing? It is at least as if he is treating her as a thing: the
thoughts that are irresistably exciting are thoughts in which
she features as something that is conquered, possessed,
owned by right, captured against her will, violated against her
will, in short (to borrow a phrase) ‘the very image of a broken
and enslaved freedom’. And there is surely more than ‘as if’:
Maria is indeed being treated as a thing. Her body is being
treated as a kind of tool, or instrument; so too are her actions.
That is shown not just in the absence of her consent to their
joint activity (under the description ‘pretending that Leonard
is raping Maria’) but in the deliberate deception. Sex has
ceased to be something he is doing with her, in the sense that
one does something with another human being, shares an
activity. It has become something he is doing with her, in the
Page 36 of 55
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: UC - Berkeley
Library; date: 10 December 2018
Sexual Solipsism
sense that one does something with a thing, uses an
instrument. The scene has a more than epistemological
claustrophobia: it is a solipsism of treating a person as a thing.
Treated as what kind of thing? As a canvas on which to project
a particular fantasy, an object that has the convenient
advantage of possessing in fact some of the qualities in
fantasy: warm, female, human, German, etc. Perhaps there is
something reminiscent here of the solipsism involved in
pornography: perhaps Leonard is treating Maria as he would
treat a pornographic artifact, the locus of a projective fantasy.
MacKinnon's words about pornography seem uncannily apt
here: ‘the human becomes thing, and the mutual becomes one‐
sided and the given becomes stolen’.
If Leonard is treating Maria as he would treat a pornographic
artifact, then there is a sense in which the two sexual
solipsisms have met. In treating her as an instrument, in
treating her as if she were an artifact, he treats her as a thing.
And in treating that thing as a human being who is in terror,
says ‘no’, submits, he animates that thing again, attributes to
it (p.345) human qualities absent in the original. Flattened to
an instrument, Maria is then reanimated with a different
human life, one in which she is then again, and in a different
way, reduced to a thing. She is treated as a thing (a mere
canvas) that is treated as a human being (a German enemy)
that is treated as a thing (through rape). He really does treat
her as if she were an instrument, a canvas. The rest is a kind
of make‐believe: but, as with pornography, the sexual
experience that depends on the make‐believe is real.
One could say, in Leonard's defense, that what Maria doesn't
know can't hurt her. But that is a barren thought. One can be
harmed by an objectifying attitude, whether one is aware of it
or not. One could say, in Leonard's defense, that this is really a
matter of seeing rather than doing: an attitude rather than an
action. That seems dubious. Leonard is using Maria as a
screen for his private theatre. And Leonard is in the end not
satisfied with his private theatre.
He found himself tempted to communicate these
imaginings to her . . . he wanted her to acknowledge
what was on his mind, however stupid it really was. He
could not believe she would not be aroused by it. . . . His
private theatre had become insufficient. . . . Telling her
Page 37 of 55
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: UC - Berkeley
Library; date: 10 December 2018
Sexual Solipsism
somehow was the next inevitable thing. . . . He wanted
his power recognized and Maria to suffer from it, just a
bit, in the most pleasurable way. . . . Then he was
ashamed. What was this power he wanted recognized? It
was no more than a disgusting story in his head. Then,
later, he wondered whether she might not be excited by
it too. There was, of course, nothing to discuss. There
was nothing he was able, or dared, to put into words. He
could hardly be asking her permission.
What does Leonard want? Notice that what he wants is precisely
what the ‘normal’ sadist wants: he wants Maria to recognize his
power, suffer from it, and be excited by it. The presence of this
desire is precisely what elevates sadistic desire to a reciprocal
moral relation, according to Scruton. Leonard is becoming the
‘normal’ sadist, who desires that the other identify herself as a
thing, desires that she should find that identification arousing. If
Scruton were right, readers should all at this point heave a sigh of
relief. At last we have an aim for reciprocity, at last we have an
intelligible moral relation, at last Leonard's ideas have become
moral ideas. But readers do not heave a sigh of relief. We wait with
dread for the (inevitable?) disaster that ensues when Leonard—
already blurring fact and fiction in his demand that his actual
power be recognized, and that Maria actually suffer—tries to
communicate (p.346) his imaginings through actions, rather than
words. Can readers hope for a happier ending? Well . . . yes, and
no. But that is another story.
4. Two Sexual Solipsisms, and Their Possible Connection
MacKinnon describes a sexual solipsism when she says that
the use of pornography amounts to ‘sex between people and
things, human beings and pieces of paper’. She not only
describes this solipsism, but condemns it. Sex ‘between people
and things’ will not exist ‘in a society in which equality is a
fact, not merely a wor...
Purchase answer to see full
attachment